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Criminal Procedure
Child Pornography and the Internet: A New Era of Regulation
Devon M. Lee
I. INTRODUCTION
It is established that the "State has no business telling a man, sitting alone in his
own house, what books he may read or what films he may watch," 'but does the State
have any business telling a man what files he may download? The battle over porno-
graphy is hardly new. The explosion of the Internet and other computer products has
created a new market for pornography and, of particular concern, child pornography.
Pornography involving children under the age of eighteen is already prohibited
under California law.2 Chapter 1080 is designed to bring child pornography laws up
to date with the computer age by adding computer-related language to child porno-
graphy statutes.3 Chapter 1079 adds evidence of child sexual exploitation to the
grounds upon which a search warrant may be issued.4
I. EXISTING LAW
Existing California law governs the sale, distribution, possession, and forfeiture
of obscene5 matter.6 Further, existing California law prohibits sexual exploitation of
a child.7 It is a felony to engage in child pornography for commercial purposes!
1. See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565 (1969).
2. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 311.1(a), 311.2(b), 311.3(a) (amended by Chapter 1080).
3. SENATE RULES COmmITTE, COMMITEE ANALYSiS OF AB 295, at 2 (Aug. 21, 1996); see CAL. PENAL
CODE §§ 311.1-311.4. 311.11 (amended by Chapter 1080) (adding specific computer-related terms such as
"computer hardware," "software" "data storage media" "CD-ROM" "computer-generated equipment," or
"computer-generated image" to the statute).
4. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1524(a)(5) (amended by Chapter 1079).
5. See id. § 311 (a) (amended by Chapter 1080) (naming "obscene matter" as that which when judged by
community standards appeals to the prurient interest, is patently offensive, and lacks serious literary, artistic,
political, or scientific value); see also Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 14, 24 (1973) (limiting obscene material subject
to regulation as that which appeals to prurient interests and depicts patently offensive sexual conduct lacking serious
literary, artistic, political, or scientific value).
6. CAL. PENAL CODE § 311 (amended by Chapter 1080); see id. § 311 (b) (amended by Chapter 1080)
(defining "matter" as any type of pictorial representation, statue, or other figure, recording, reproduction, or
telephone message used as part of a commercial transaction).
7. Id. § 311.3 (amended by Chapter 1080). Section § 311.3(a) of the California Penal Code indicates that
"sexual exploitation of a child" occurs when a person:
knowingly develops, duplicates, prints, or exchauges any representation of information, data, or image,
including, but not limited to, any film, photograph, negative, slide, photocopy, videotape, video laser
disc, computer hardware, computer software, computer floppy disc, data storage media, CD-ROM, or
computer-generated equipment or any other computer-generated image that contains or incorporates in
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Previous California law lacked the vocabulary to deal with computer terms, leading
to the concern that pornographers could use discs, CD-ROMS, and new products and
escape prosecution. 9
HI. NEW LAW
Chapter 1080 is designed to expand the definition of "matter" to include
information available by computer.' 0 Chapter 1080 also requires film and photo pro-
cessors who observe a picture of a child under fourteen engaged in an act of sexual
conduct to report this to a law enforcement agency."' Chapter 1080 protects persons
or entities who provide access to a system or network over which there is no control
of substance by providing an affirmative defense. t2In addition, Chapter 1079 makes
it easier to obtain a search warrant in child pornography cases. Evidence tending to
show that a person has current or prior possession of child pornography can now be
used to obtain a warrant.'
3
any manner, any film or filmstrip that depicts a person under the age of 18 years engaged in an act of
sexual conduct.
Id. § 311.3(a) (amended by Chapter 1080); see id. § 11166(c) (amended by Chapter 1080) (defining "sexual
conduct" as sexual intercourse, vaginal or rectal penetration, masturbation, sadomasochistic abuse, exhibition of
genital, pubic, or rectal areas, defecation, or urination for the purpose of se)xually stimulating the viewer).
8. Id. § 311.2(b) (amended by Chapter 1080); see id. (creating a punishment of two, three or six years or
a fine of $100,000, or both for engaging in child pornography for commercial purposes).
9. See SENATEJUDICIARYCOMMrrEECOMMmIrEEANALYSISoFAB 295, at4 (June 18,1996) (noting that
law enforcement agencies felt deterred from seeking warrants for information stored in computer media due to a
lack of computer media language in the statute); see also 1988 Cal. Stat. ch. 1378, sec. 1, at 4647 (lacking current
computer terms).
10. SENATEJUDICIARYCOMMIEE, COMMrfEEANALYSISOFAB295, at2 (June 18, 1996); see id. (noting
that one of the purposes of Chapter 1080 is to add computer terms to the obscenity and child pornography statutes),
The definition of "matter" includes:
any representation of information, data, or image, including, but not limited to, any film, filmstrip,
photograph, negative, slide, photocopy, videotape, video laser disc, computer hardware, computer
software, computer floppy disc, data storage media, CD-ROM, or computer-generated equipment or any
other computer-generated image that contains or incorporates in any manner, any film, or filmstrip.
CAL PENAL CODE § 311.1 (a) (amended by Chapter 1080).
11. CAL. PENAL CODE § 11166(c) (amended by Chapter 1080).
12. See id. § 312.6(b) (enacted by Chapter 1080) (proclaiming that employers are not liable for the action
of an employee unless such action is sanctioned or within the scope of employment); id. 312.6(c) (enacted by
Chapter 1080) (providing a defense to prosecution under Chapter 1080 for any person who takes reasonable,
effective, and appropriate actions to restrict or prevent the transmission of, or access to, the prohibited communi-
cation).
13. Id § 1524(a)(5) (amended by Chapter 1079); see id. (declaring that a search warrant may be issued when
property to be seized consists of evidence that tends to show either sexual exploitation of a child or possession of
child pornography has occurred or is occurring).
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IV. ANALYSIS OF NEW LAW
Regulating the Internet presents unique difficulties. Once information is released
onto the Net, where it goes (and who sees it) cannot be controlled.' 4 Because there
is so much information available from so many sources and the Internet is a truly
international medium, effective regulation may be nearly impossible.
The Internet provides a forum for individuals to present any information desired.
Not surprisingly, the Net has been used by pornographers to distribute pictorial and
written pornography.' 5 Therefore, limiting regulation of the Internet could potentially
protect pornographers who conduct business via computer.
Another concern when attempting to regulate the Internet is the standards to be
used in determining obscenity. Because local standards are used to determine
whether something is obscene,' 6 a critical step is to ascertain whose standards will
be used.
This question was addressed in United States v. Thomas,'7 in which a couple
challenged their convictions for interstate transmission and transportation of ob-
scenity.'" The couple made child pornography available through the use of a com-
puter bulletin board. ' 9 They argued that the federal statute did not apply to intangible
objects like the computer files that were at issue.20 The court found that the legis-
lative intent was to regulate obscene materials regardless of the medium, including
computers.2 '
The couple also argued that venue was incorrect. Tennessee's "community stan-
dards" were used instead of California's, where the couple ran their business,
because the material was sent to Tennessee.22 This case demonstrated the potential
difficulties in using the "community standard" test to determine what is obscene on
the Internet. What is considered obscene in Tennessee may be socially acceptable in
California. What is considered obscene in the United States might be acceptable in
Europe.
Perhaps aware of the difficulties of applying current law to the Internet, the
federal government attempted to regulate the Internet through the Communications
14. American Civil Liberties Union v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824,844 (E.D. Pa. 1996).
15. See generally Fred H. Cate, Law in Cyberspace, 39 How. L.J. 565, 568-73 (1996) (discussing unique
difficulties of applying obscenity standards to the Internet).
16. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (stating that local standards are used to determine if
material is obscene).
17. 74 F.3d 701 (6th Cir. 1996).
18. Thomas, 74 F.3d at 706.
19. Id. at 705.
20. See idt at 706 (arguing that the federal statute did not expressly prohibit their conduct because computer
files are not "tangible"); see also 18 U.S.C.A. § 1465 (West 1984) (prohibiting the interstate transportation of
obscene tangible objects).
21. Thomas, 74 F.3d at 709.
22. Id. at 709; see Cate, supra note 15, at 570-73 (reviewing the Thomas case and discussing the difficulty
of determining whose "community standards" should be used in cyberspace).
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Decency Act of 1996.2 The Act, in part, criminalizes use of an interactive computer
device to send or display to a child any "patently offensive" sexual material. 24 It also
prohibits knowingly permitting the use of any telecommunications facility for pro-
hibited purposes.2 5 The Act does provide a "safe harbor" much like Chapter 1080 for
persons who simply provide access to the computer. 
6
In American Civil Liberties Union v. Reno,27 two sections of the Act regulating
obscenity came under constitutional attack.2 The court found that the Internet pre-
sents unique First Amendment issues 9 The court argued that the Internet deserves
more protection from government regulation than almost any other form of mass
communication2 0 The court declared unconstitutional parts of the Act attempting to
ban indecent and "patently offensive speech."3' While the federal court found the
Internet deserving of added protection, the court did stress that current laws against
obscenity and child pornography do apply to the Internet?
2
V. CONCLUSION
Chapters 1080 and 1079 deal specifically with child pornography, which can be
prohibited regardless of whether the matter is considered obscene? 3 Child porno-
graphy need not be considered obscene to be prohibited because child pornography
laws are intended to protect children from sexual exploitation and its harmful
effects.34
23. Communications Decency Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104,110 Stat. 133 (amending 47 U.S.C. § 223).
24. id. § 502, 110 Stat. at 133-34 (amending 47 U.S.C. § 223(d)(1)).
25. Id. § 502, 110 Stat. at 133 (amending 47 U.S.C.§ 223(a)(2)).
26. Id. § 502, 110 Stat. at 134 (amending 47 U.S.C. § 223(e)).
27. 929 F. Supp. 824 (E.D. Pa. 1996).
28. See American Civil Liberties Union, 929 F. Supp. at 828 (challenging sections of the Communications
Decency Act of 1996 which prohibit transmitting obscene material to children via a "telecommunications device"
and which criminalize using an "interactive computer service" to send or display offensive material to children);
see also Communications Decency Act of 1996 § 502, 110 Stat. at 133-34 (amending 47 U.S.C. §§ 223(a)(1)(B),
(d)) (outlining the above prohibited acts).
29. American Civil Liberties Union, 929 F. Supp. at 830.
30. See id. at 881 (concluding that the Internet deserves the "broadest possible protection from government-
imposed, content-based regulation"); see also Ramon G. McLeod, Court Protects Free Speech on Internet, S.F.
CHRON., June 13, 1996, at A15 (noting that the court was reluctant to allow regulation of the Internet).
31. American Civil Liberties Union, 929 F. Supp. at 882; see Miller, 413 U.S. at 30 (noting that the jury may
measure th-. factual issues of"patent offensiveness" by the standard that prevails in the forum community).
32. American Civil Liberties Union. 929 F. Supp. at 833.
33. New York v. Ferber. 458 U.S. 747 (1982); see id. at 756-62 (finding that the state must have greater
leeway in the regulation of child pornography since the state has a compelling interest in protecting the well-being
of children, that child pornography leads to the abuse of children, and that there is little value in permitting child
pornography).
34. United States v. Freeman, 808 F.2d 1290, 1292 (8th Cir. 1987).
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Chapters 1080's and 1079's prohibitions are limited to pictures depicting
children in a sexual manner.35 Therefore, there is little chance that Chapters 1080 and




Penal Code §§ 312.6, 312.7 (new), §§ 311, 311.1, 311.2 311.3, 311.4,
311.11, 312.3, 11166 (amended).
AB 295 (Baldwin); 1996 STAT. Ch. 1080
Penal Code § 1524 (amended).
AB 1734 (Frusetta); 1996 STAT. Ch. 1079
35. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 31 1(h) (amended by Chapter 1080) (limiting matter to visual works which
depict a child "personally engaging in personally stimulating sexual conduct" by adopting the holding of People
v. Cantrell); see also People v. Cantrell, 7 Cal. App. 4th 523,542,9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 188, 199 (1992) (limiting child
pornography to visual works).
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Compelled Testimony and Self-Incrimination: Is "Use and
Derivative Use" Immunity Worth Adopting?
Joshua M. Dickey
I. INTRODUION
The privilege against self-incrimination holds a hallowed place in the
constitutional framework of the United States. However, this privilege often collides
with the government's ability to collect information needed to enforce its criminal
statutes. Immunity statutes maintain the privilege guaranteed by the Constitution,
while enabling the government to effectively enforce criminal laws. Chapter 302
amends § 1324 of the California Penal Code, changing the type of immunity granted
for compelled testimony that may be self-incriminating.'
II. CALIFORNIA'S IMMUNrrY STATUTE
A. California Law Before Chapter 302
Under existing law, when a witness in a felony proceeding2 invokes the Fifth
Amendment privilege,3 refusing to answer a question or produce evidence on the
grounds that doing so may be self-incriminating, the prosecutor may request the
court to compel the witness to answer the question or produce the requested
evidence.4 The court, after a hearing, shall compel compliance with the district attor-
ney's request unless doing so would subject the witness to prosecution in another
jurisdiction or would be contrary to the public interest.5
Prior law required a grant of transactional immunity for compelled testimony that
was self-incriminating.6 Thus, if the person had been privileged not to answer or pro
1. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1324 (amended by Chapter 302).
2. See id. (including investigations or proceedings before a grand jury for any felony offense).
3. See U.S. CONST. amend. V (declaring that no person shall be compelled to be a witness against one's
self in a criminal case); see also CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 15, cl. 6 (stating that people may not be compelled to be a
witness against themselves); CAL. EviD. CODE § 940 (West 1995) (providing that "[tlo the extent that such privilege
exists under the Constitution of the United States or the State of California, a person has a privilege to refuse to
disclose any matter that may tend to incriminate him").
4. CAL PENAL CODE § 1324 (amended by Chapter 302).
5. Id.
6. 1953 Cal. Stat. ch. 1353, sec.l, at 2912 (enacting CAL. PENAL CODE § 1324); see People v. Campbell,
137 Cal. App. 3d 867,874, 187 Cal. Rptr. 340,344 (1982) (stating that prior law required transactional immunity);
cf. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 3502 (1996) (requiring the grant of transactional immunity for compelled, self-
incriminating testimony); MICH. COmp'. LAWS ANN. § 767.19b (West 1996) (same); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 30-19-14,
30-9-6 (Michie 1996) (same); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 50.10 (McKinney 1996) (same); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2945.44 (Anderson 1997) (same); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-17-15 (1996) (same); State v. Miyasaki, 614 P.2d 915,
923-24 (Haw. 1980) (interpreting Article I, § 10 of Hawaii's Constitution as requiring transactional immunity);
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duce evidence but for the order compelling testimony, that person could not be
prosecuted or penalized for any "fact or act" concerning the compelled testimony!
Accordingly, transactional immunity shields a defendant from prosecution for any
crime implicated by the compelled testimony.8 Although transactional immunity was
broader than necessary to remain within the mandate of the Fifth Amendment,9
before the enactment of Chapter 302, transactional immunity remained viable in
California because the legislature failed to restrict the immunity granted to the con-
stitutional minimum.' °
B. California Law After Chapter 302
Chapter 302 provides that "no testimony or other information directly or
indirectly derived from the testimony or other information may be used against the
witness in any criminal case."" Thus, Chapter 302 changes the type of immunity
granted for compelled self-incriminating testimony from "transactional" immunity
to "use and derivative use" immunity.'2 Chapter 302 also provides that a district
attorney may still request an order granting transactional immunity.
3
Use and derivative use immunity prohibits all evidentiary uses of compelled
testimony in a subsequent prosecution of a witness, including the use of the testi-
mony to gather other evidence. 4 By providing for use and derivative use immunity,
Chapter 302 increases prosecutorial flexibility because prosecutors are not forced to
choose between prosecuting a defendant and obtaining the defendant's testimony. 5
People v. Lee, 410 N.E.2d 646, 649 (111. App. Ct. 1980) (interpreting 725 Illinois Compiled Statutes Annotated
5/206-1 as authorizing only transactional immunity); Attorney Gen. v. Colleton, 444 N.E.2d 915, 920 n.8 (Mass.
1982) (stating that Massachusetts Annotated Laws chapter 233, § 20G grants transactional immunity); State v.
Soriano, 693 P.2d 26, 26 (Or. 1984) (declaring that only transactional immunity is permissible under Article 1, §
12 of Oregon's Constitution for compelled testimony).
7. 1953 Cal. Stat. ch. 1353, sec. 1, at 2912 (enacting CAL. PENAL CODE § 1324).
8. See People v. Campbell, 137 Cal. App. 3d 867, 874, 187 Cal. Rptr. 340, 343 (1982) (stating that
transactional immunity immunizes a defendant from prosecution for any crime implicated by the compelled
testimony). But see CAL. PENAL CODE § 1324 (amended by Chapter 302) (stating that a witness may be prosecuted
for perjury as a result of his or her compelled testimony).
9. See Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441,453 (1972) (acknowledging that transactional immunity
is broader than is constitutionally mandated).
10. Campbell, 137 Cal. App. 3d at 876, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 346.
11. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1324 (amended by Chapter 302) (emphasis added).
12. SENATECOMMrrrEEON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, COMMrrrEE ANALYSIS oFAB 988, at 3 (June 11, 1996);
cf. ALASKA STAT. § 12.50.101 (Michie 1996) (providing, respectively, for use and derivative use immunity for
compelled testimony that is self-incriminating); GA. CODE ANN.§ 24-9-28 (1996) (same); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 35-34-
2-8, 35-37-3-3 (West 1996) (same); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-15-331 (1996) (same).
13. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1324 (amended by Chapter 302).
14. Campbell, 137 Cal. App. 3d at 873-74, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 343; see id. (commenting that use and
derivative use immunity "preclude[s] punishment for the compelled disclosures by cutting the causal link between
the incriminating testimony and its use through the exclusion of the compelled testimony or any evidence derived"
therefrom).
15. SENATE COMMrTEE ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, COMMITITEEANALYSISOFAB 988, at4 (June 11, 1996).
1997/ Criminal Procedure
Prosecutors will no longer have to make this choice because, unlike transactional
immunity, use and derivative use immunity still allows the prosecution of the witness
with independently obtained evidence. 6
C. Support and Opposition
Proponents of Chapter 302 argue that the testimony of codefendants is often
necessary in prosecuting drug offenses or offenses involving multiple individuals
because codefendants are often the only witnesses to the crime." Use and derivative
use immunity allows prosecutors to obtain evidence necessary for conviction without
granting a blanket immunity to the witness for the witness's culpable actions.18
Hence, Chapter 302 serves the public interest by enabling a prosecutor to compel
valuable testimony, while still allowing the prosecution of all culpable parties pro-
vided that independent evidence exists to prosecute the witness.
Opponents of Chapter 302 fear that use and derivative use immunity dilutes an
individual's Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination by allowing
prosecutors to obtain information that they otherwise would not be able to obtain
which could subsequently be used to prosecute the witness. 19 The California
Attorneys for Criminal Justice and the American Civil Liberties Union worry that
prosecutors will misuse a witness's testimony to obtain independent evidence in
order to prosecute the witness.2°
I1. CONSTITUTIONALITY AND CONTROVERSY
A. The Background of Immunity Statutes
The Fifth Amendment mandates that no person "shall be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself."2' However, it has long been estab-
lished that the power of the courts to compel testimony is an essential power of the
16. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 459-60 (1972); see id. (stating that a total prohibition exists
upon the use of the incriminating testimony but, at the same time, allowing the prosecution of a witness provided
that the prosecution proves the evidence used to prosecute the witness is independent of the witness's privileged
testimony); SENATE COMmrrrEE ON CRIMNAL PROCEDURE, COmMrrIEE ANALYSIS OFAB 988, at 2 (June I1, 1996)
(acknowledging that the purpose of Chapter 302 is to allow a narrower immunity so that a witness may still be
prosecuted where independent evidence of a crime exists).
17. SENATECOMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, COMMrrEE ANALYSIS oFAB 988, at 5 (June 11, 1996);
see Richard Barbieri, The Deal of a Lifetime, RECORDER, Oct. 15, 1992, at 1 (describing a case wherein a hired
murderer was granted transactional immunity and set free in exchange for his testimony against his co-conspirators).
This article is demonstrative of the breadth of transactional immunity.
18. SENATCOMmITaEONCRIMNALPROCEDURECOMMMtr'EEANALYSISOFAB 988, at4 (June 11, 1996).
19. Id.
20. Id. at 5.
21. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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government. 2 When a conflict arises between the Fifth Amendment and the
government's power to compel testimony, the power to compel testimony must yield
to the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination 3 Accordingly, im-
munity statutes provide an essential function in accommodating the government's
interest in compelling testimony while preserving a person's Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination.24
The mere grant of some type of immunity is not enough to satisfy the consti-
tutional mandate. Instead, the immunity granted for compelled testimony must be co-
extensive with the privilege against self-incrimination. 25 Thus, the immunity granted
must extend "as broad as the mischief against which it seeks to guard," and must not
compel testimony that could, in any way, be used against the witness to show the
witness had committed a crime.26
B. The Birth of the Transactional Immunity Requirement in Federal Courts
In Counselman v. Hitchcock,"7 Counselman appeared as a witness in a grand jury
investigation into violations of a transportation statute and refused to answer certain
questions on the grounds that they would be self-incriminating? 8 The prosecutor
sought to compel Counselman's testimony based upon a statute which provided the
following:
[N]o answer or other pleading of any party, and no discovery or evidence
obtained by means of any judicial proceeding... shall be given in evidence,
or in any manner used against such a party or witness, or his property or
estate, in any court of the United States, in respect to any crime, or for the
enforcement of any penalty or forfeiture, by reason of any act or omission
of such party or witness .... 29
Counselman refused to testify, was held in contempt of court, and was taken into
custody by the marshall. 0
22. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441,443-44; see id. (tracing the history of the government's power
to compel testimony and noting the importance of this power).
23. Id. at 444; see id. (noting that the power to compel testimony must yield to the fundamental aspect of
liberty embodied in the Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination).
24. Id. at 445-46; see id. (stating that immunity statutes are not incompatible with the Fifth Amendment).
25. Id. at 452-53.
26. Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547,562 (1892).
27. 142 U.S. 547 (1892).
28. Counselman, 142 U.S. at 548.
29. Id. at 560 (quoting Act of February 25, 1868, 15 Stat. 37 (1868)).
30. Id. at 552.
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The Supreme Court found this statute unconstitutional because it did not prevent
the derivative use of the testimony to seek out other testimony or evidence by which
Counselman may have been convicted. The Supreme Court went on to declare that:
[No statute which leaves the party or witness subject to prosecution after he
answers the criminating [sic] question put to him, can have the effect of
supplanting the privilege conferred by the Constitution of the United States.
... [A] statutory enactment, to be valid, must afford absolute immunity
against future prosecution for the offense to which the question relates.
3 2
The Compulsory Testimony Act of 189333 was passed shortly after the Counsel-
man decision and provided that "no person shall be prosecuted or subjected to any
penalty or forfeiture for or on account of any transaction" implicated by the com-
pelled testimony.34 In 1953, California passed Penal Code § 1324 basing it upon the
decision in Counselman and the federal statute authorizing transactional immunity. 5
C. A Move Away from the Transactional Immunity Requirement
However, the Supreme Court in Kastigar v. United States36 later determined that
the Fifth Amendment did not require the broad grant of transactional immunity man-
dated by Counselman v. Hitchcock.37 At issue in Kastigar was a 1970 statute that
Congress passed after careful study. The statute allowed compelled testimony of self-
incriminating information so long as the witness was granted use and derivative use
immunity.38 The Supreme Court reviewed the Counselman decision and found that
the problem with the statute at issue in Counselman was that it did not prohibit the
derivative use of compelled testimony to prosecute the witness.39 Because the 1970
statute provided for both use and derivative use immunity,4° the Supreme Court held
31. Id. at 564.
32. Id. at 585-86.
33. 27 Stat. 443 (1893). repealed by Act of October 15, 1970 § 245, Pub. L. No. 91452, 84 Stat. 923, 931.
34. Compulsory Testimony Act of 1893, 27 Stat. 443, 444.
35. SENATE COMITEE ON CRIMINALPROcEDURE, COMM1TIEEANALYSIS oFAB 988, at 3 (June 11, 1996);
see People v. Campbell, 137 Cal. App. 3d 867,875, 187 Cal. Rptr. 340,344-45 (1982) (stating that California Penal
Code § 1324 adopted the federal immunity language with slightly different grammar).
36. 406 U.S. 441 (1972).
37. Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 452-54.
38. Id. at 452-53 n.36; see id. (discussing the careful study of the National Commission on Reform of
Federal Criminpl Laws which served as a model for 18 U.S.C. § 6002); see also 18 U.S.C.A. § 6002 (West Supp.
1996) (authorizing use and derivative use immunity).
39. Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 453-54.
40. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 6002 (West Supp. 1996) (stating that "no testimony or other information compelled
under the order (or any information directly or indirectly derived from such testimony or other information) may
be used against the witness in any criminal case").
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that the immunity statute afforded the requisite protection mandated by the Fifth
Amendment.41 Thus, use and derivative use immunity, together, are constitutional.42
Use and derivative use immunity allows the subsequent prosecution of a witness
compelled to produce evidence that is self-incriminating, provided that the evidence
used in prosecuting the witness derives from an independent source.43 However, the
burden of proof lies with the prosecution to prove that the evidence was obtained
from an independent source. 44 Thus, arguably this protection is commensurate with
the protection granted by the Fifth Amendment 5
D. Controversy Over Use and Derivative Use Immunity
Although use and derivative use immunity is constitutional, it is not without its
share of controversy. Many people are not persuaded that use and derivative use im-
munity provides a witness with protection commensurate with the Fifth Amendment.
For example, Justice Marshall, in his dissent in Kastigar, argued that use and
derivative use immunity was inadequate to meet the requirements of the Fifth
Amendment privilege. 6 He emphasized the slight burden placed on the prosecutor
in proving that evidence employed in the prosecution of the witness was obtained
independently of the compelled testimony.47 According to Marshall, the nature of the
investigatory process placed information concerning the origin of the evidence solely
within the knowledge of the prosecutor.4 g Thus, Justice Marshall asserted that the
prosecution would easily meet its burden of proof because the prosecution's mono-
poly of knowledge regarding the investigatory process precluded the defendant from
introducing contrary evidence.4 9
41. Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 453; see id. (stating that the Fifth Amendment privilege does not mean a person
cannot be subsequently prosecuted for a crime related to the compelled testimony; rather, it provides protection
against being forced to implicate oneself in a criminal act).
42. See id. at 462 (finding a statute providing use and derivative use immunity constitutional).
43. See supra note 14 and accompanying text (stating that use and derivative use immunity prohibits all
evidentiary uses of compelled testimony in the subsequent prosecution of a witness).
44. Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 460; see SENATE COmm E ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, COMMITrEE ANALYSIS
OF AB 988, at 5 (June 11, 1996) (stating that a prosecutor will be required to show that the evidence used in a
subsequent prosecution was not derived from the defendant).
45. Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 461; SENATE COMMIrEE ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, CoMMI-rEE ANALYSIS OF
AB 988, at 5 (June 11, 1996).
46. Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 467-71 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
47. Id. at 469 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
48. Id.; see id. (explaining that only the prosecution is in a position to trace how the information was
obtained in the investigatory process); see also John F. Martoccio, Note, Kastigar v. United States: Compulsory
Witness Immunity and the Fifth Amendment, 6 JOHN MARsHALL J. PRAC. & PROC. 120, 132 (1972) (noting that a
defendant who has been previously compelled to testify is at a disadvantage because the prosecution has exclusive
knowledge about the source of its evidence and the defendant has limited opportunity for discovery); Note,
Standards for Exclusion in Immunity Cases After Kastigar and Zicarelli, 82 YALE L.J. 171, 181 (1972) (same).
49. Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 469 (Marshall, J., dissenting). But see Richard L. Thornburgh, Reconciling
Effective Federal Prosecution and the Fifth Amendment: "Criminal Coddling," "The New Torture" or "A Rational
Accommodation?," 67 J. CRM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 155, 161-62 (1977) (arguing that subsequent lower court
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Moreover, Marshall asserted that a prosecutor may not even know about the
derivative use of testimony; investigators could use the testimony to gather further
evidence against the witness without the prosecutor's knowledge.!' Therefore, the
allocation of the burden of proof on the prosecution does little to insure the
witness's/defendant's Fifth Amendment privilege.5' Thus, the possibility exists that
the prosecution could use privileged testimony to find "independent" evidence and
subsequently prosecute a witness.52
Commentators have expressed additional concerns about use and derivative use
immunity. For example, the prosecutor may base his or her decision to prosecute a
witness upon the witness's testimony.53 Moreover, the possibility exists that
privileged testimony may be used by the prosecutor to shape the prosecutor's
strategy without using the evidence in an evidenciary manner.54 The monopoly that
the government holds over its investigatory information amplifies these concerns.55
Thus, some commentators argue that a defendant is not left in the same position had
the defendant not been compelled to testify.
56
E. Critique of Use and Derivative Use Immunity
The argument that the government will easily meet its burden in showing the
independence of evidence, because the defendant will be unable to introduce contra-
dictory evidence, seems over simplistic. Assuming a defendant has no contrary
decisions have interpreted Kastigar as placing a near impossible burden on prosecutors in seeking to prove the
independence of evidence used in the subsequent prosecution of a witness compelled to testify).
50. Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 469 (Marshall, J., dissenting); see Martoccio, supra note 48, at 133 (stating that
the prosecution's evidence may be tainted in an investigation without the prosecutor's knowledge).
51. SENATE COMMrrrEE ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, COMMIrEE ANALYSIS OF AB 988, at 4-5 (June 11,
1996); see id. (reiterating the fears of the opponents of Chapter 302 that the testimony of an immunized witnes; may
be misused to subsequently prosecute that witness); see also Martoccio, supra note 48, at 133 (observing that the
independence of the government's evidence may be established by mere assertion because of the disadvantages that
the defendant faces); Lawrence Rubenstein, Immunity and the Self-Incrimination Clause, 2 AM. J. CRIM. L. 29, 45-
46 (1973) (stating that a taint-free prosecution may be impossible because of the informal exchange of information
that takes place in offices).
52. See, e.g., WAYNE R. LAFAVE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 8.11 (1992) (listing
concerns that Kastigar will not prevent a prosecutor from working backwards with immunized testimony to find
a source that the prosecutor can claim is independent).
53. Martoccio, supra note 48, at 136-37; see id. (declaring that the prosecution could determine the likely
outcome or relative strength of the case based upon the privileged testimony).
54. Hal M. Koontz & Jeffrey C. Stodel, Note, The Scope of Testimonial Immunity Under the Fifth
Amendment: Kastigar v. United States, 6 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 350, 381 (1973).
55. See supra notes 48-52 and accompanying text (discussing the difficulty that a defendant faces in
rebutting the government's assertion that its evidence was obtained independently).
56. Koontz & Stodel, supra note 54, at 382-83; see Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 468 (1972)
(Marshall, J., dissenting) (stating that the immunity granted must put the defendant in precisely the same position
with the government that the defendant would have been had the defendant not testified). But cf. id. at 462
(declaring that the grant of immunity must leave a defendant in substantially the same position with the government,
as if the defendant did not testify, to be coextensive with the privilege against self-incrimination).
Pacific Law Journal / VoL 28
evidence, the absence of such evidence does not establish the prosecution's case that
the evidence was obtained independently. The defendant may prevail by discrediting
the prosecution's case without affirmatively proving that evidence was not obtained
independently. This may be done through the- defendant's own investigation and
cross-examination. Although contrary evidence would certainly be helpful to the
defendant, contrary evidence is not an absolute necessity. Thus, the defendant is
afforded some level of protection by placing the burden of proof on the prosecution.
In the eyes of the majority of the Supreme Court in Kastigar, this level of protection
is enough to satisfy the Fifth Amendment.
5 7
Although use and derivative use is constitutional, it affords more opportunity for
abuse than transactional immunity, which may compromise the Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination. Transactional immunity prohibits the prosecution
of a witness for any crime implicated by the testimony.8 Thus, abusing a witness's
testimony is impossible because the defendant is immune from prosecution for all
crimes related to the compelled testimony.
Conversely, use and derivative use immunity provides for the prosecution of the
witness, if the prosecution proves the evidence used in prosecuting the witness is
obtained independently of the testimony?59 Thus, though arguably unlikely, Chapter
302 makes it possible to prosecute a witness with evidence derived from the wit-
ness's testimony provided that the individuals involved in prosecuting the witness
can adequately fabricate a story and "prove" that the evidence was obtained
independently.
Ironically, Chapter 302 may hinder a prosecutor's ability to extract necessary
testimony from a witness. Witnesses faced with the prospect of future prosecution
may be more unwilling to testify.60 At the very least, witnesses may give superficial
testimony to protect themselves.6t Thus, in practice, Chapter 302 may insulate those
individuals, such as the leaders of organized criminal activity, who the prosecution
would most like to incarcerate because prosecutors lack the testimony needed to
convict them.
57. See supra notes 36-41 and accompanying text (discussing the holding of Kastigar).
58. People v. Campbell, 137 Cal. App. 3d 867, 874, 187 Cal. Rptr. 340,343 (1982).
59. See supra note 16 and accompanying text (stating that use and derivative use immunity allows the
subsequent prosecution of the witness with independently obtained evidence).
60. See Rubenstein, supra note 51, at 46 (stating that use and derivative use immunity may impede access
to information because witnesses may be more unwilling to testify, opting instead for a contempt charge when faced
with the possibility of future prosecution); Koontz & Stodel. supra note 54, at 383 (stating that witnesses may be
more willing to face contempt charges than face possible prosecution in the future); Martoccio, supra note 48, at
138 (asserting that use and derivative use immunity quells a witness's motivation to speak).
61. See Martoccio, supra note 48, at 138 (arguing that a witness may say what the witness thinks the




Chapter 302's use and derivative use language mimics a federal law expressly
found constitutional by the United States Supreme Court.62 Thus, Chapter 302 will
almost certainly withstand a federal constitutional attack. Similarly, Chapter 302 will
withstand a state constitutional attack unless the California Supreme Court interprets
the California Constitution as requiring transactional immunity.63
In the abstract, Chapter 302 has tilted the scales of justice in favor of law
enforcement by enabling prosecutors to compel a witness's testimony while allowing
the subsequent prosecution of the witness. However, in practice Chapter 302 has
afforded a greater opportunity for the abuse of one of the fundamental rights
guaranteed by our Constitution. The possibility of such abuse coupled with the pos-
sibility of a legitimate future prosecution may render a witness more willing to suffer
a contempt charge, rather than produce incriminating evidence. Thus, the true pur-
poses of Chapter 302, prosecutorial flexibility combined with the ability to extract
essential testimony, may be hindered. Therefore, Chapter 302 probably will not




Criminal Procedure Code § 1324 (amended), § 1324.1 (repealed).
AB 988 (Hawkins); 1996 STAT. Ch. 302
62. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 6002 (West Supp. 1996) (containing the same relevant language regarding use and
derivative use immunity as Chapter 302); see also Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441,462 (1972) (holding that
18 U.S.C. § 6002 is constitutional).
63. No authority exists in California that supports the proposition that California's Constitution requires
transactional immunity for compelled testimony that is self-incriminating. But see State v. Miyasaki, 614 P.2d 915,
923-24 (Haw. 1980) (interpreting Article 1, section 10 of Hawaii's Constitution as requiring transactional
immunity); State v. Soriano, 693 P.2d 26.26 (Or. 1984) (mandating that only transactional immunity is permissible
under Article I, section 12 of Oregon's Constitution for compelled testimony).
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Domestic Violence: I Don't Need to Have Bruises to Feel Pain-A
Worthy Exception to the Warrant Requirement
Crystal Cunningham
I. INTRODUCTION
Enraged that Pamela forgot to buy his beer, Mike begins shouting obscenities at
her. His anger escalates with each justification that she tries to offer. As Pamela
walks away to try to avoid the blows that she fears will follow, Mike strikes her in
the back of the head, knocking her to the ground. He straddles her and continues to
punch her in the stomach. She manages to free herself and call the police. Pamela
begs the police to arrest him, but they are unable to fulfill her pleas for help because
she has no visible injuries.
Even more furious at having to explain himself to the police, Mike continues the
attack as the police car vanishes from sight. However, this time he grabs a knife and
stabs her until her lifeless body falls to the floor. If the police had arrested Mike,
Pamela would still be alive. However, under prior California law, police were not
authorized to make warrantless arrests for domestic violence when there was no
visible injury.' Therefore, perpetrators of domestic violence could slap, punch, or
kick a family member, and no matter how much emotional or physical pain their
abuse caused, they would escape arrest if the injuries were not visible. Thus, when
police officers were called to a house before a domestic fight had climaxed and
before serious injury had occurred, they were unable to arrest the perpetrator and
break the chain of violence before it swung out of control and caused serious injury
or death.
Chapter 131 was introduced to provide greater protection to domestic violence
victims'-protection that is unavailable under current law. It allows for the arrest of
those previously fortunate perpetrators of domestic violence who struck their victims
in an area that did not readily produce a visible injury.3 However, as is the case with
most warrantless arrests, there is a delicate balance between providing protection for
the victim and respecting the constitutional rights of the offender.
In California, domestic violence is considered a felony or a misdemeanor,
depending on the circumstances surrounding the offense.4 The offense is considered
a felony when the person willfully inflicts corporal injury resulting in a traumatic
1. See CAL. PENALCODE § 273.5 (West Supp. 1997) (making it a felony to willfully inflict "corporal injury
resulting in a traumatic condition"); see infra notes 5, 9, 10 (defining "traumatic condition").
2. SENATE COMMITrEE ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 2116, at 4 (June 11,
1996).
3. CAL. PENAL CODE § 836(d) (amended by Chapter 131).
4. See id. § 273.5 (West Supp. 1997).
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condition5 upon his or her spouse, upon any person with whom he or she is co-
habitating,6 or upon any person who is the mother or father of his or her child! This
offense requires a lesser standard of violence than that required for felony battery!
Thus, a person accused of domestic violence can be charged with a felony for
inflicting even a minor injury, unlike other felonies that require serious or great
bodily injury.9 However, "minor injury" excludes infliction of pain that does not
result in injury. 0 Therefore, a defendant who inflicts only pain cannot be charged
with a felony and thus is subject to misdemeanor charges only. Chapter 131 is
designed to allow for warrantless arrests of persons who fit into this narrow gap of
those who merely inflict pain without any evidence of injury."t
Currently, under California law, peace officers are permitted to arrest a person
without a warrant for a felony not committed in their presence if there is reasonable
cause for making the arrest. t2 Existing law further provides that in order for a peace
officer 13 to arrest a person without a warrant for a misdemeanor, the officer must
have reasonable cause t4 to believe that the person has committed a public offense in
the officer's presence.' 5 However, existing law also authorizes peace officers to make
5. See id. § 273.5(c) (West Supp. 1997) (defining "traumatic condition" as a wound or external injury,
whether of a minor or serious nature, caused by a physical force).
6. See People v. Holifield, 205 Cal. App. 3d 993, 1001, 252 Cal. Rptr. 729,734 (1988) (stating that in light
of its use in other statutes and case law, "cohabitating" means an unrelated man and woman living together in a
substantial relationship, one that includes permanence and sexual or amorous intimacy).
7. CAL. PENAL CODE § 273.5 (West Supp. 1997).
8. Id.; see id. § 243(d) (West Supp. 1997) (requiring "serious bodily injury" for a fclony battery).
9. Compare id. § 273.5 (West Supp. 1997) with id. § 245(aX1) (West Supp. 1997) (requiring "force likely
to produce great bodily injury" for felony assault).
10. People v. Abrego, 21 Cal. App. 4th 133, 138,25 Cal. Rptr. 2d 736,739 (1993); see id. (determining that
the statutory requirement of "injury resulting from a traumatic condition" includes minor injury, but that the
soreness and tenderness that the victim experienced did not fall within this requirement).
11. SENATECOMMrrrEEONCRMINALP OCEDURE, COMMrmEEANALYSISOFAB 2116, at 7 (June 11, 1996);
see CAL. PENAL CODE § 836 (amended by Chapter 131) (setting forth misdemeanor offenses for which officers are
permitted to make warrantless arrests even though the misdemeanors do not occur in their presence).
12. CAL. PENALCODE § 836(a)(2) (amended by Chapter 131).
13. See id. § 830 (West Supp. 1997) (defining "peace officer" as any person who meets all standards
imposed by law on a peace officer).
14. See People v. Crovedi, 253 Cal. App. 2d 739, 743, 61 Cal. Rptr. 349, 352 (1967) (proclaiming that
reasonable cause exists when an officer knows from the circumstances at the moment of arrest that an offense has
been committed and a person with reasonable caution would have found it so).
15. CAL. PENAL CODE § 836(a)(1) (amended by Chapter 131); United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 418
(1976); see Music v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 221 Cal. App. 3d 841,847-48, 270 Cal. Rptr. 692, 696 (1990)
(providing that in determining whether an officer had cause to arrest a person, a court must ascertain when the arrest
occurred and what the arresting officer then knew, and whether the officer's knowledge at the time of the arrest
constituted adequate cause); see also People v. Campa, 36 Cal. 3d 870, 878, 686 P.2d 634, 637,206 Cal. Rptr. 114,
117 (1984) (recapitulating that the federal and California Constitutions prohibit warrantless arrests within the home,
even with probable cause, unless there are exigent circumstances).
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warrantless arrests for misdemeanors not occurring in the officer's presence under
limited circumstances.16
Chapter 131 provides that a peace officer may make a warrantless arrest of per-
sons who commit an assault or battery upon their spouses, upon persons with whom
they are cohabitating, or upon the parents of their child if the peace officer has
reasonable cause to believe that the persons to be arrested have committed the assault
or battery and the peace officer makes the arrest as soon as reasonable cause arises, 7
whether or not the assault or battery has in fact been committed. 8 Thus, Chapter 131
creates another exception to the general rule that a peace officer needs a warrant to
arrest a person for a misdemeanor that was not committed in the officer's presence.
16. CAL. PENAL CODE § 836(c)(1) (amended by Chapter 131); see id. (authorizing an officer to make a
warrantless arrest when responding to a call alleging a violation of a protective order, whether or not the violation
has occurred in the presence of the officer, and the officer has reasonable cause to believe that the person against
whom the order is issued has notice of the order and has committed an act in violation of the order); id. § 836.1
(West Supp. 1997) (providing that grounds for warrantless arrest exist when the person commits an assault or
battery against firefighters or other specified personnel); kd. § 836.3 (West 1985) (allowing a peace officer to make
a warrantless arrest of an escapee charged with or convicted of a misdemeanor); id. § 12031(a)(4) (West Supp.
1997) (providing for the warrantless arrest of someone carrying a loaded firearm in a public place); see also id. §
243.5 (West 1988) (providing for the warrantless arrest of someone who commits an assault on school property
during school hours when school activities are taking place).
17. CAL PENAL CODE § 836(d) (amended by Chapter 131); see William A. Schroeder, Warrantless
Misdemeanor Arrests and the Fourth Amendment, 58 Mo. L. REV. 771,852 (1993) (observing that if arrest is not
made as soon as reasonable cause arises, there should be adequate time to obtain a warrant).
18. CAL PENAL CODE § 836(d) (amended by Chapter 131). Some states permit peace officers to make
warrantless arrests for domestic violence without reasonable cause. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 15-10-3(a)(8) (1995)
(providing that an officer may arrest any person without a warrant whenever an offense involves family violence);
ARK. CODE ANN. § 1681-113 (Michie Supp. 1993) (same); MiNN. STAT. ANN. § 629.34(1) (West Supp. 1996)
(same). Other states allow an officer to make a warrantless arrest for domestic violence when he has reasonable
cause to believe that the person committed an assault or battery. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 19-603(6) (Supp. 1996)
(providing that a peace officer may, without warrant, arrest a person at the scene of a domestic disturbance when
there is reasonable cause to believe, based upon physical evidence observed by the officer or statements made in
the presence of the officer upon immediate response to a report of a commission of such a crime, that the person
arrested has committed an assault or battery); IOWA CODE ANN. § 804.7(5) (West 1994) (authorizing a peace officer
to make an arrest without a warrant if the peace officer has reasonable grounds for believing that domestic abuse
has occurred and has reasonable grounds for believing that the person to be arrested has committed it). Some states
require "probable cause" rather than "reasonable cause" in order to make a warrantless arrest for domestic violence.
See, e.g., Miss. CODE ANN. § 99-3-7(3) (1994) (permitting a peace officer to make a warrantless arrest of an
individual who has committed an act of domestic violence within twenty-four hours of the arrest); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 31-1-7 (Michie Supp. 1995) (same); OK.A. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 40.3(B) (West Supp. 1996) (same); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-3-2.1(2)(a) (Michie Supp. 1996) (same); WYo. STAT. ANN. § 7-20-102(a) (Michie Supp.
1995) (same).
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II. ANALYSIS OF CHAPTER 131
Proponents of Chapter 131 assert that existing law does not adequately provide
peace officers with practical solutions to misdemeanor domestic violence cases. 9
Proponents further argue that because domestic violence assaults rarely occur in the
officer's presence, there is little assistance they can provide with respect to arrests.
20
Furthermore, early arrest is an appropriate response to the cyclical nature of domestic
violence because it will break the chain of violence before it swings out of control
possibly causing serious injury or death.2t
Opponents, on the other hand, argue that the expansion of the warrantless arrest
powers to domestic violence could lead to false arrests.22 Arrest is an extraordinary
intrusion upon the personal rights of the individual; thus, a warrant is required unless
the activity poses a substantial threat to public safety.23 Warrants protect due process
rights by requiring a showing of cause to an impartial magistrate.24
There are very limited exceptions to the general rule that a peace officer needs
a warrant to arrest a person for a misdemeanor that was not committed in the
officer's presence.25 All but one exception involve the possibility of physical harm
to others: the arrest of a probationer or parolee believed to be in violation of their
probation or parole?2 However, this exception takes root in the fact that a person on
probation or parole has fewer rights than the ordinary individual.27 Opponents con-
tend that domestic violence does not pose the type of threat to public safety that
would justify authorizing warrantless arrests.28 Furthermore, by the time the peace
officer arrives, usually the assault or battery has been committed already?9 There-
fore, the officer should be required to obtain a warrant from a magistrate.30




22. Id. at 5.
23. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573,579 n.13 (1980).
24. Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740,749 n.10 (1984).
25. See supra note 16 (listing exceptions).
26. Compare CAL PENAL CODE § 836.3 (West 1985) (probationer/parolee exception) with id. § 836.1 (West
Supp. 1996) (assault or battery against firefighters exception); id. § 836.3 (West 1985) (escapee exception) and
id. § 12031(2) (West 1985 & Supp. 1997) (carrying a loaded firearm in a public place exception).
27. Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868,874 (1987) (citing Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471,480 (1972)).
28. SENATE COMMrITEE ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 2116, at 5 (June 11,
1996).
29. Id.
30. See supra note 17 and accompanying (discussing the requirement of obtaining a warrant as soon as
reasonable cause arises).
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A. Exigent Circumstances Requirement for Warrantless Home Arrests
Notwithstanding the aforementioned support and opposition, Chapter 131 raises
significant constitutional issues. The Fourth Amendment guarantees that people shall
be secure from unreasonable searches and seizures.3 ' There is a greater expectation
of privacy in one's home32 because home arrests involve a two-step process that
invade two separate interests: First, the intrusion into the home; and second, the
actual arrest.33 By contrast, an arrest in a public place involves only the second step,
and thus invades only one type of interest. 34 For this reason, home arrests deserve a
greater degree of protection. Accordingly, in Justice Brennan's majority opinion in
Welsh v. Wisconsin,35 he noted that warrantless home arrests, even with probable
cause, are barred absent exigent circumstances.3 When exigent circumstances exist,
the right of the police to enter a home without a warrant is diminished if the arrest
is to be made for a minor offense.37 The distinction between the gravity of the offense
is drawn because the privacy interest remains the same while the government's
interest in making the arrest decreases as the seriousness of the offense decreases.38
Courts have generally rejected the argument that misdemeanors can be justified on
the premise that arrestees have a reduced expectation of privacy because they are
suspected of committing a crime.3 9 This means it is likely that the privacy interest
31. U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see id. ("The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated."); see also CAL. CONST. art. I, § 13
(incorporating the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution into the California Constitution); id. art.I, § 19
(providing an express right of privacy).
32. See, e.g., Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474,477,484-88 (1988) (opining that the protection of unwilling
listeners within their homes from the intrusion of unwanted speech is a significant government interest); Stanley
v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 568 (1969) (holding that the First Amendment prohibits making the mere private
possession of obscene material in one's own home a crime); id. at 564-65 (emphasizing that individuals have the
right to privacy in their own homes); Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961) (stating that "[alt the
very core [of the Fourth Amendment] stands the right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free from
unreasonable governmental intrusion").
33. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573,588-89 (1980).
34. See Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 220-21 (1981) (holding that the Fourth Amendment
requires that police officers who search the house of one person in order to execute a warrant for the arrest of
another person must obtain a warrant to search the third party's home).
35. 466 U.S. 740 (1984).
36. Welsh, 466 U.S. at 754; see id. (holding a warrantless entry into a suspect's home to arrest him for a
minor traffic offense unconstitutional); see also People v. Boragno, 232 Cal. App. 3d 378,386,283 Cal. Rptr. 452,
457 (1991) (defining "exigent circumstances" as "an emergency situation requiring swift action to prevent imminent
danger to life or serious damage to property, or to forestall the imminent escape of a suspect or destruction of
evidence"); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294,298-300 (1967) (holding that no warrant was needed when, under
the "exigencies of the situation," police officers entered the house when they were in hot pursuit of a suspected
armed felon who had entered only minutes before they arrived).
37. Welsh, 466 U.S. at 754 n.14.
38. Schroeder, supra note 17, at 841-42.
39. See Mincey v. Arizona, 473 U.S. 385, 391 (1978) (commenting that to hold a person's expectations of
privacy are reduced because the person is suspected of having engaged in illegal activities would "convict the
suspect even before the evidence against him was gathered").
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will be overshadowed by the gravity of the offense. Justice Brennan observed that
the gravity of the underlying offense is an important factor to consider when deter-
mining whether exigent circumstances exist.40 In its evaluation, a California court is
likely to consider the gravity of a domestic violence offense quite high. This is
evidenced by the fact that the legislature determined that the gravity was significant
enough to classify it as a felony.4'
Chapter 131 does not draw a distinction between arrests in the individual's home
and those in a public place. However, when determining whether a home arrest for
domestic violence is constitutional, a court is likely to examine whether the violence
is of such a nature as to render it an exigency.42 One such factor that this examination
will probably include is whether leaving the victim with the batterer to go and obtain
a warrant would subject the victim to further violence.43 In People v. Wilkins," the
California Court of Appeal concluded that the risk of imminent violence resulting in
further physical harm to the victim of domestic violence was an exigent circumstance
requiring immediate action, and thus the court validated a police entry into the
defendant's home to make a warrantless arrest45
B. Constitutionality of Warrantless Arrests for Misdemeanors
The Supreme Court has never directly addressed the issue of whether a
warrantless arrest for a misdemeanor is constitutional if it does not occur in the
officer's presence.46 However, Chapter 13 1's constitutionality is further evidenced
by lower court decisions addressing the issue in recent years. Most decisions have
held that the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit warrantless arrests for mis-
demeanors not committed in the officer's presence.47 However, at least one federal
40. Welsh, 466 U.S. at 753.
41. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 273.5 (West 1988).
42. See supra notes 32-36 and accompanying text (discussing the requirement of exigent circumstances).
43. See infra notes 44-45 and accompanying text.
44. 14 Cal. App. 4th 761, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d 743 (1993).
45. Wilkins, 14 Cal. App. 4th at 772. 17 Cal. Rptr. at 749; see id. (concluding that entrance into a home was
further justified by the defendant's wife's consent to the entry).
46. See Welsh, 466 U.S. at 756 (White, J., dissenting) (noting that the Court has never held that the Fourth
Amendment requires a warrant to arrest for misdemeanor offenses not occurring in the officer's presence); see also
Maryland v. Macon, 472 U.S. 463, 471 (1985) (observing that the question whether the Fourth Amendment
prohibits a warrantless arrest for a misdemeanor violation should be left for a future day).
47. See, e.g., Fields v. City of S. Houston, Tex., 922 F.2d 1183, 1189 (5th Cir. 1991) (declaring that there
is no warrant requirement mandated by the United States Constitution to arrest individuals for misdemeanors not
occurring in the arresting officer's presence); Barry v. Fowler, 902 F.2d 770, 772 (9th Cir. 1990) (reasoning that
the Fourth Amendment does not require that a misdemeanor occur in the officer's presence to justify a warrantless
arrest); Street v. Surdyka, 492 F.2d 368, 372 (4th Cir. 1974) (determining that the Fourth Amendment does not
prohibit warrantless arrests for misdemeanors not committed in the officer's presence); see also United States v.
Mayo, 792 F. Supp. 768,770-71 & n.2 (M.D. Ala. 1992) (upholding warrantless home entry to arrest a person for
a misdemeanor and authorizing states to continue to expand the power to arrest without a warrant as long as the
Constitution's requirement of probable cause is met); Boucher v. Town of Southbridge, 679 F. Supp. 131, 133 (D.
Mass. 1988) (holding that the warrantless arrest for the misdemeanor of driving while intoxicated did not violate
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court has suggested that warrantless misdemeanor arrests may violate the United
States Constitution.48 Additionally, in one of the few cases that the Supreme Court
commented on this question, the Court stated that narcotics agents could have made
a warrantless arrest of the defendant only for a felony, or a misdemeanor committed
in the presence of the officer.49
Current practices also suggest that it is constitutional. There is a strong pre-
sumption that is evidenced by the fact that so many states have enacted statutes
providing exceptions to the common law rule? Fifteen states and the District of
Columbia mandate warrantless arrests when there is probable cause to believe that
the offender committed any crime against a family memberYl Federal legislation
provides further evidence of the constitutionality of warrantless misdemeanor arrests
by offering funding to states that utilize mandatory arrest policies for domestic
violence.52 Given the prevalence of warrantless arrest statutes for misdemeanors not
committed in an officer's presence and the widespread support in state case law, a
court deciding this issue probably will conclude that it is constitutional.
C. Probable Cause vs. Reasonable Cause
Probable cause is always required for arrests, whether it is with or without a
warrant.53 Chapter 131 specifically requires reasonable cause rather than probable
cause." The two standards, though different in name, appear to be quite similar.
federal constitutional law and observing that other courts have recognized that such arrests are not prohibited by
the Fourth Amendment if they are based on probable cause).
48. See Gramenos v. Jewel Co., 797 F.2d 432,441 (7th Cir. 1986) (noting that the Supreme Court has never
ruled on this question and suggesting that the historical bar on such arrests may be "a useful guide" to their
constitutionality).
49. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 15 (1948) (holding that the search violated the Fourth
Amendment of the federal Constitution and overturning the conviction for the violation of federal narcotic laws);
see Bad Elk v. United States, 177 U.S. 529, 535 (1900) (noting that at common law an officer was not allowed to
make a warrantless arrest for a misdemeanor not committed in the officer's presence).
50. See infra note 51 (giving examples of other states' warrantless arrest codes for domestic violence).
51. See ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3601(B) (West Supp. 1996); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-38b(a)
(West 1995); IOWA CODE ANN. § 236.12(2) (West 1994); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46:2140(1) (West Supp. 1997);
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 770(5) (West 1981); MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 209A, § 6(7) (West Supp. 1997);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 629.34(1)(c) (West Supp. 1997); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 455-085(1) (West Supp. 1997); NEV. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 171.137(1) (Michie 1995); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-21 (a) (West 1995); OR. REV. STAT. § 133.310(1)
(1995); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-29-3(b) (1994); S.D. CODIFmED LAWS § 23A-3-2.1(2) (Michie Supp. 1996); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 77-36-2.2 (1997); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.31.100(2) (West Supp. 1997).
52. 42 U.S.C.A. § 10410(a)(2)(c) (West 1995); see also United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411,416 (1976)
(observing that there is a strong presumption for the constitutionality of an act of Congress).
53. Watson, 423 U.S. at 418.
54. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 836(a)(1) (amended by Chapter 131).
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Recent case law indicates that probable cause is determined by examining the
"totality of the circumstances."55 This test calls for a practical, common-sense
decision as to whether, given all the circumstances, there is a fair probability that the
crime was committed.56 In Beck v. Ohio,57 the United States Supreme Court stated
that probable cause exists when "the facts and circumstances within their [the
arresting officers'] knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy infor-
mation were sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing that [the person to be
arrested] had committed or was committing an offense. ' 58 In People v. Crovedi59 a
California appellate court similarly found that reasonable cause exists when an
officer knows from the circumstances at the moment of arrest that an offense has
been committed and a person with reasonable caution would have found it so.W
Reasonableness can often be determined by prevailing rules in individual states
and court decisions.61 Currently, most states allow warrantless misdemeanor arrests
for certain exigent circumstances and for certain specific offenses, such as domestic
violence. 62 Although a statute or practice does not necessarily provide immunity from
constitutional attack, when the word is as vague as reasonable, custom will play a
significant role in the constitutional analysis.63 All of the states have enacted legis-
lation permitting warrantless arrests for domestic violence.64 Among these states, the
terms reasonable cause and probable cause are used with approximately the same
frequency. 65 For example, South Dakota permits warrantless arrests when the officer
has probable cause to believe the person has committed an assault on his or her
spouse6 6 While Idaho's statute is worded differently, an officer may make a war-
rantless arrest of a person at the scene of a domestic disturbance if there is reasonable
cause to believe the person has committed an assault or battery.67 This is basically
using probable cause. The Idaho code states that reasonable cause is based upon
physical evidence observed by the officer or statements made in the presence of the
officer.68 These grounds for reasonable cause are reminiscent of the totality-of-the-
55. See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213,238 (1983) (reaffirming the totality-of-the-circumstances analysis);
see also Tennessee v. Gamer, 471 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1985) (citing cases that apply the totality-of-the-circumstnces
analysis); Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 760 (1985) (examining the facts and circumstances of the case to deter-
mine whether th-_ intrusion was justified).
56. See Gates, 462 U.S. at 238.
57. 379 U.S. 89 (1964).
58. Beck, 462 U.S. at 91 (citations omitted).
59. 253 Cal. App. 2d 739, 61 Cal. Rptr. 349 (1967).
60. Crovedi, 253 Cal. App. 2d at 743, 61 Cal. Rptr. at 352.
61. Garn.-r, 471 U.S. at 15-16.
62. See supra notes 18, 51 (listing statutes).
63. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 600 (1980).
64. See supra note 18 (providing examples of domestic violence statutes of other states).
65. See supra note 18 (listing examples of statutes).
66. S.D. CODIED LAWS § 23A-3-2.1(2)(a) (Michie Supp. 1996).
67. IDAHO CODE § 19-603 (Supp. 1996).
68. Id.
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circumstances test used for probable cause.69 Both the state courts and the federal
courts, including the Supreme Court, use the terms interchangeably.0
The "reasonable cause" standard probably will withstand constitutional scrutiny.
Its similarity in definitions with probable cause makes it appear to be the same
standard as probable cause, which is constitutionally sufficient.
H. CONCLUSION
In California, Chapter 131 is long overdo and greatly appreciated by women like
Pamela who sustain beatings by their spouses and, because the husbands were
fortunate enough to strike them in areas that do not readily reveal injury, the police
could not protect the victims by arresting their assailants. Now, police are em-
powered to arrest the perpetrator and break the chain of violence before it swings out
of control and causes serious injury or death. Given the exigency of protecting
against probable, immediate, physical harm, the prevalence of warrantless arrest
statutes for domestic violence, and the widespread support in case law, Chapter 131
is likely to survive constitutional scrutiny.
APPENDIX
Code Section Affected
Penal Code § 836 (amended).
AB 2116 (Alby); 1996 STAT. Ch. 131
69. See supra notes 53-60 and accompanying text (discussing the totality-of-the-circumstances and probable
cause analysis).
70. See, e.g., United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 418 (1976) (discussing that a peace officer is permitted
to arrest without a warrant for a misdemeanor committed in the officer's presence if there is a reasonable ground
for making the arrest).
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I. INTRODUCTION
I knew nothing about him... [None of us did. If I had been aware of
his record, my daughter would be alive. I would never have allowed her
to cross the street.
-Maureen Kanka'
Megan Kanka's parents were unaware that their suburban New Jersey com-
munity was unsafe for their daughter. They were unaware that their neighbor, Jesse
Timmendequas, was a twice-convicted felon who had already served six years for
sexual assault,2 one of his victims being a seven-year-old girl just like Megan.3 They
were unaware and could do nothing. And so, in July of 1994, on her way home from
a friend's house, little Megan Kanka could do nothing to protect herself. Lured into
his house by the promise to see a puppy,4 Megan was victimized by Timmendequas
-first strangled, then raped, and finally killed by asphyxiation.5 If only she had
known.
Spurred into action by the incident, Megan's family and neighbors campaigned
for legislation that would require law enforcement to notify members of the public
who may be unknowingly at risk from sex offenders living nearby.6 In response,
New Jersey's legislators passed a series of "emergency" registration and notification
bills in an effort to provide some assurance.7 Governor Whitman promptly signed the
new measures into law on October 31, 1994, just three months after Megan's death.8
One of the bills-known as "Megan's Law"--requires that law enforcement provide
notification to communities, schools, and other institutions when a convicted sex
offender poses a potential risk to their safety.9 Which segments of the public receive
information about the registrant is based upon a three-tiered system of categorizing
an offender's potential risk to the community. 0 The theory underlying Megan's Law
1. Richard Jerome et al., Megan's Legacy; Little Megan Kanka Was Brutally Murdered. Now Her Family
Wants Other Parents to Know when a Sex Offender Moves in Next Door, PEOPLE, Mar. 20, 1995, at 46 (quoting
Maureen Kanka as she expressed feelings of helplessness regarding the circumstances surrounding the death of her
daughter Megan).
2. Jan Hoffman, New Law Is Urged on Freed Sex Offenders, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 4, 1994, at B1.
3. Anna Quindlen. So What if Law Isn't Fair to Sex Offenders?; Children Come First, Clu. TRtB.. Aug.
8, 1994, at 13.
4. Id.
5. See Jerome, supra note 1, at 46.
6. Joseph F. Sullivan, Whitman Approves Stringent Restrictions on Sex Criminals, N.Y. TIamss, Nov. 1,
1994, at B 1.
7. Under the "emergency" status, the bills bypassed committee discussion and were put to a vote the same
day as the second reading. See W.P. v. Poritz, 931 F. Supp. 1199, 1203-04 (D. NJ. 1996) (reviewing the
circumstances surrounding the passage of Megan's Law).
8. Sullivan, supra note 6, at BI.
9. Id. See generally NJ. STAT. ANN. §§ 2C:7-1 to -Il (West 1995 & Supp. 1996) (establishing provisions
for the registration and notification of the release of certain sex offenders).
10. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:7-8(a) (West 1995).
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is the greater the risk posed by an offender, the more widespread the warnings
become to ensure society's safety. For example, information on Tier I offenders
(designated as "low risk"' t) is provided solely to law enforcement agencies likely to
encounter the registrant, 12 while a Tier II ("moderate risk' 3) offender's information
may be disseminated among law enforcement as well as specified community organi-
zations, including schools, religious groups, and youth groups.'4 Tier HI ("high
risk"') offenders face the release of information to law enforcement, specified com-
munity organizations, as well as all members of the public likely to encounter the
registrant. 16
Since New Jersey adopted Megan's Law in 1994, more than thirty states have
followed suit by enacting their own community notification laws. 7 This year
California has joined these states, adopting its own version of Megan's Law-
Chapter 908.18 Like New Jersey's law, Chapter 908 establishes a three-tiered system
of risk categorization and corresponding public notification. 9
In addition to joining states that have adopted Megan's Law, or a similar version,
California's legislators have also set the state apart from the rest of the country-
showcasing their unmatched, "get tough" attitude on sex crimes-by enacting
Chapter 596, a groundbreaking law mandating chemical castration for the "worst of
the worst" two-time sex offenders.2°
A. California Sexual Offender Law: Past and Present
The passage of Chapters 908 and 596 represents the culmination of a wave of
reformation to California's sex offender laws that first arose several years ago in
11. See id. § 2C:7-8(b) (West 1995) (noting that factors relevant to the determination of re-offense risk
include, but are not limited to: (1) Parole conditions that minimize risk of re-offense; (2) physical condition3 such
as advanced age or debilitating illness that would minimize the risk of re-offense; (3) criminal history indicative
of high risk of re-offense, such as repetitive and compulsive criminal conduct, whether the offender served the
maximum term, and whether the offender committed the sex offense against a child; (4) othcr criminal history
factors, including the relationship between the offender and the victim, whether the offense involved a weapon or
resulted in injury, and the number, date and nature of prior offenses; (5) whether the offender has a psychological
or psychiatric profile that indicates a risk of recidivism; (6) the offender's record of responding to treatment; (7)
recent behavior, including behavior exhibited while imprisoned and behavior exhibited while on probation or
parole, and (8) recent threats against people, or expressions of intent to commit further crimes).
12. Id. § 2C:7-8(c)(1) (West 1995).
13. See supra note 11 (listing the factors that are relevant to the level of risk determination).
14. NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2C:7-8(c)(2) (West 1995).
15. See supra note I1 (listing the relevant factors of the risk-level determination).
16. NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2C:7-8(c)(3) (West 1995).
17. Wilson Signs Sex-Offender Bill; Photos Will Be Available to Public at Police Stations, S.F. EXAM., Sept.
26, 1996, at A6.
18. See CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 290,290.4 (amended by Chapter 908).
19. Compare NJ. STAT. ANN. §§ 2C:7-1 to -11 with CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 290,290.4 (amended by Chapter
908).
20. CAL. PENAL CODE § 645 (amended by Chapter 596).
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response to an ailing system of sex offender registration.21 Adopted in 1947, the
registration system was novel at the time, making California the first state in the
country calling for sex offenders to register with local law enforcement officials upon
release from prisonY2 The motivation behind the system was the thought that
registration would combat the high recidivism rate of sex offenders by arming police
with information to aid in the apprehension of suspects.3
Other states soon followed California's lead by enacting similar legislation:
Arizona in 1951, Nevada in 1961, and Alabama in 19674 Illinois and Arkansas
passed registration laws in 1986 and 1987, respectively, 25 and since 1989, a multitude
of states rapidly followed suit.2 Presently, all fifty states have enacted sex offender
registration statutes.2 7
California's current registration system requires specified sex offenderse8 to
register with the chief of police or sheriff in the city, county, or campus 29 in which
they are domiciled, upon parole.30 As long as the sex offender resides in California,
these registration requirements apply for life?'
Over the last decade or so of mandatory sex offender registration in California,
several inadequacies have become apparent? 2 One flaw that has surfaced with the
system relates to its reactive, rather than proactive, nature.33 As primarily a
reactionary tool, the system aids only in post-crime apprehension, instead of helping
police prevent sex offenses in the beginning. In addition, over the years, the amount
21. See infra notes 32-36 and accompanying text (detailing the inadequacies of Califomia's sex offender
registration system).
22. 1947 Cal. Stat. ch. 1124, sec. 1. at 2562-63 (enacting CAL. PENAL CODE § 290); see Abril R. Bedarf,
Examining Sex Offender Community Notification Laws, 83 CAL. L. REv. 885, 887 n.4 (stating that California's sex
offender registration law was the first in the nation).
23. People v. Mills, 81 Cal. App. 3d 171, 176, 146 Cal. Rptr. 411,414 (1978); see id. (declaring that the
fundamental legislative purpose underlying § 290 of the California Penal Code is to assure that sex offenders are
readily available for police surveillance at all times).
24. Bedarf, supra note 22, at 887 n.4; see ALA. CODE §§ 13A-1 1-200 to -203 (1994); Apt_. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 13-3821 to -3824 (1989 & Supp. 1996); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 207.151-.157 (Michie 1992 & Supp. 1996).
25. Bedarf, supra note 22, at 887 n.4; see ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 12-12-901 to -909 (Michie 1995); ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 730, paras. 150/1-150/10.9 (Smith-Hurd 1992 & Supp. 1996).
26. Bedarf, supra note 22, at 887 nA.; see, e.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 57, §§ 581-87 (West 1991 & Supp.
1997); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 9A.44.130 to -.140 (West Supp. 1997).
27. Sex Offender Loses Challenge to Classification as High Risk, N.Y. LJ., July 9, 1996, at 25 n.l.
28. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 290(a)(2) (amended by Chapter 908) (listing the persons who shall be required
to register as sex offenders, including, for example, offenders convicted of kidnaping with intent to commit child
molestation under California Penal Code § 207(b), offenders convicted of sexual battery (Penal Code § 243.4), and
offenders convicted of rape by foreign object (Penal Code § 264.1)).
29. Id. § 290(aXl) (amended by Chapter 908) (requiring the offender to register with the chief of police of




32. See Bedarf, supra note 22, at 900 (noting that California's registration system has evidently been failing
since 1985).
33. Id. at 903.
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of information collected in the registry databases has grown so large that they have
become unmanageable and of little practical utility.34 The result is a seemingly aban-
doned system where much of the information contained in the registries is outdated,
incorrect, or nonexistent. 35 Finally, any information that was accurate and accessible
in the registries could be obtained by only the police; the public had no such access
and thus never knew whether a friend or neighbor was a registered sex offender.
36
In an effort to cure some of these inadequacies plaguing the registration system,
California's legislators began their wave of reformation legislation. The first surge
occurred on September 26, 1994, when Governor Wilson approved a law requiring
the Department of Justice to operate a 1-900 telephone number through which con-
cerned members of the public could inquire as to whether a questionable individual
had been registered as a sex offender convicted of committing specified crimes
against children. 7 Parents using the line could obtain an offender's name and
physical description, thereby dashing the offender's ability to hide behind a cloak of
anonymity.38 Since its inception in July of 1995, the line has received more than 7000
calls and has resulted in more than 600 matches.39
The wave of reformation gained further strength when legislators afforded con-
cerned parents the option of searching for suspicious, potential predators in the Child
Molester Identification Line Subdirectory.4 The subdirectory listed those persons
deemed by the Department of Justice to be habitual sex offenders and a threat to pub-
34. Id. at 901; see id. (confirming that the police do not have adequate resources to check every name on
the registry when attempting to solve a sex offense).
35. Id. at 901-02; see id. (reporting that in 1984, a sheriff's captain in San Bernardino, after conducting an
investigation, found that 90% of the addresses in the sex offender registry were inaccurate). The author states that
in 1993, in Sacramento County, an investigation revealed that 80 out of 100 registered sex offender addresses were
incorrect. Id. Finally, the author reports that the California Department of Justice has estimated that the state has
accurate information in its registries regarding sex offenders only 24% of the time. Id.
36. See 1995 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 85, sec. 1, at 208-12 (amending CAL. PENAL CODE § 290) (same); 1995
Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 91, sec. 120, at 296-300 (amending CAL. PENAL CODE § 290) (having no provisions,
authorizing public dissemination of registrant information); 1995 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 840, sec. 2. at 4976-79
(amending CAL. PENAL CODE § 290) (same).
37. See 1995 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 85, sec. 2, at 212-15 (amending CAL. PENAL CODE § 290.4) (specifying
the offenses to which the 1-900 number applied as: (1) Rape, if the victim is a minor (California Penal Code § 261);
(2) procuring a minor for prostitution (Penal Code § 266); (3) abduction of a minor for purposes of prostitution
(Penal Code § 267); (4) kidnaping to commit child molestation (Penal Code § 207(b)); (5) sodomy of a minor
(Penal Code § 286(b) or (c)); (6) child molestation (Penal Code § 288); (7) oral copulation where the victim is a
minor (Penal Code § 288a(b)(2) or (c)); (8) continuous child sexual abuse (Penal Codp § 288.5); (9) foreign object
rape of a minor (Penal Code § 289(i) or (j)); (10) child molestation punishable by California Penal Code § 647.6;
and (11) kidnaping, punishable pursuant to § 208(d) of the California Penal Code if the victim is a minor); 1995
Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 840, sec. 3, at 4979-85 (amending CAL. PENAL CODE § 290.4) (same).
38. CAL. PENAL CODE § 290A(a)(2) (amended by Chapter 908).
39. Cassandra Stern, California Waging War on Sexual Predators; Chemical Castration Law Is State's
Latest Weapon, WASH. POST, Sept. 24, 1996. at A3.
40. 1995 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 85, sec. 2, at 212-15 (amending CAL. PENAL CODE § 290.4); 1995 Cal. Legis.
Serv. ch. 840, sec. 3.1, at 4982-85 (amending CAL. PENAL CODE § 290.4).
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lic safety,4' and permitted concerned parents to browse through pictures of convicted
offenders, obtaining information regarding their name, physical description, age, and
distinctive markings.4 2
One weakness degrading these devices of community empowerment was their
requirement that the parent take the first step by actively seeking out information
regarding a suspicious person. Some parents inevitably would not take that initiative,
while others would be unable to determine who was "suspicious" and who was not,
and be unwilling to investigate an entire pool of potential offenders.
This year, with California's adoption of Chapters 908 and 596, the wave of
reformation has reached its crest, with laws providing for active public dissemination
by the police of sex offender information and, for a select few, chemical castration. 43
1. Chapter 908: Community Notification
Chapter 908 restructures California's sex offender laws-integrating the old with
the new- into a three-tiered system of public notification.44 Tier I-entitled "Public
Inquiry"45-provides the public with access to information regarding sex offenders
using two devices: (1) An expanded version of the already existing 1-900 telephone
line, and (2) a newly created CD-ROM directory. Chapter 908 updates the 1-900
line by increasing the number of offenders whose information will be included!
7
Previously, only offenders guilty of specified sex offenses against children were put
on the line.48 The new line, however, will include information regarding offenders
41. 1995 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 85, sec. 2, at 212-15 (amending CAL. PENAL CODE § 290.4); 1995 Cal. Legis.
Serv. ch. 840, sec. 3.1, at 4982-85 (amending CAL. PENAL CODE § 290.4).
42. 1995 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 85, sec. 2, at 212-15 (amending CAL. PENAL CODE § 290.4); 1995 Cal. Legis.
Serv. ch. 840, sec. 3.1, at 4982-85 (amending CAL. PENAL CODE § 290.4).
43. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 290, 290.4 (amended by Chapter 908); id. § 645 (amended by Chapter 596).
44. SENATE FLOOR, Co?,MrmTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 1562, at 1 (Aug. 29, 1996).
45. Id.
46. CAL. PENAL CODE § 290.4(a)(1)-(5) (amended by Chapter 908).
47. See id.
48. 1995 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 85, sec. 2, at 212-15 (amending CAL PENAL CODE § 290.4); 1995 Cal. Legis.
Serv. ch. 840, sec. 3, at 4979-85 (amending CAL. PENAL CODE § 290.4).
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guilty of committing crimes without regard to the victim's age, such as rape49 and
felony sexual battery. 0
Furthermore, Chapter 908 expands and clarifies the information available on the
1-900 number. Specifically, Chapter 908 requires that the line include not only a
physical description, criminal history, and address of an offender-as previously
required-but also any known aliases of the offender, the offender's gender, race,
date of birth, and zip code in which the offender resides, not including information
that would identify the offender's victim5
Chapter 908 also repeals provisions calling for a child molester identification line
subdirectory, and supplants them with requirements for the creation of an updated
CD-ROM directory.52 Specifically, Chapter 908 requires the Department of Justice,
on or before July 1, 1997, to provide a CD-ROM, or other electronic medium, con-
taining specified information 3 to certain law enforcement agencies. 4 These agencies
must then make the CD-ROM available for public viewing 5
49. See CAL PENAL CODE § 261 (West 1988 & Supp. 1997) (defining "rape" as "an act of sexual intercourse
accomplished with a person not the spouse of the perpetrator, under any of the following circumstances:" (1) V/here
the person is mentally or physically incapable of giving legal consent, and this is known by the person committing
the act; (2) where it is accomplished by force, violence, duress, menace or fear of bodily injury; (3) where the
person is prevented from resisting by any alcohol or drug; (4) where the person is unconscious; (5) where the person
submits after the perpetrator has induced, by artifice, pretense, or concealment, a belief that they are the victim's
spouse; (6) where the act is committed under threat of future retaliation; and (7) where the act is committed under
threat of using the authority of a public official to incarcerate, arrest, or deport the victim, and the victim believes
that the perpetrator is a public official).
50. Id. § 290.4(a)(1) (amended by Chapter908); see id. § 243.4 (West 1988 & Supp. 1997) (defining "sexual
battery" as any of the following: (1) The forceful touching of an intimate part of another person while that prrson
is unlawfully restrained by the accused or an accomplice for the purposes of sexual arousal, gratification, or abuse;
(2) the forceful touching of an intimate part of another person while that person is institutionalized for medical
treatment and the touching is for the purposes of sexual arousal, gratification, or abuse; or (3) forcefully causing
any person who is restrained to masturbate or touch an intimate part of another person's body, for the purpo,.es of
sexual arousal, gratification or abuse). The other offenses for which the 1-900 now applies, in addition to the
offenses previously available via the line, include: (I) Sexual assault, except assault to commit mayhem (California
Penal Code § 220); (2) foreign object rape in concert with another (Penal Code § 264.1); (3) felony unlawful sex
when consent procured by false representation (Penal Code § 266c); (4) felony sodomy (Penal Code § 286(b)(2),
(d), (f), (g), (i), (j) or (k)); (5) oral copulation (Penal Code § 288a(d), (f), (g), (i), (j) or (k)); and (6) foreign object
rape (Penal Code § 289(a), (b), (d), (e), (f), (g) and (h)). Id. § 290.4(a)(1) (amended by Chapter 908).
51. Id. § 290.4(a)(2) (amended by Chapter 908).
52. Compare 1995 Cal. Legis. Serv. oh. 85, sec. 2. at 212-15 (amending CAL. PENAL CODE § 290.4) and
1995 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 840, sec. 3.1, at 4982-85 (amending CAL. PENAL CODE § 290.4) (providing for the
creation of a subdirectory listing certain child molesters) with CAL. PENAL CODE § 290.4(a)(4)(A) (amended by
Chapter 908) (establishing a CD-ROM directory).
53. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 290.4(a)(2) (amended by Chapter 908) (listing the information that will be
available on the CD-ROM). The information is identical to that available on the 1-900 line and includes: the name
and any known aliases of the offender, a photograph, a physical description, gender, race, date of birth, criminal
history, the address at which the offender resides, and any other information the Department of Justice deems
relevant, not to include any information that would identify the victim. Id.
54. See id. § 290.4(a)(4)(A) (amended by Chapter 908) (listing the various law enforcement agencies
receiving the CD-ROM, including the sheriffs department in each county, and municipal police departments of
cities with a population of more than 200,000 people).
55. Id.
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Within Tier II, law enforcement agencies are authorized to provide specified
information56 to persons57 "likely to encounter '58 a registered offender 9 when peace
officers "reasonably suspect[]," based on information that has come to their atten-
tion by any peace officer or member of the public, that a child or other person may
be "at risk' from certain offenders.62
Finally, under Tier I of the new system, law enforcement agencies are aut-
horized to notify the general public of "high-risk" sex offenders in their community. 63
A "high-risk" sex offender is defined by Chapter 908 as a person who has been con-
victed of an offense for which registration is required under California Penal Code
§ 290(a)(2),64 and who also meets at least one of the following criteria: (1) Has been
convicted of three or more violent sex offenses,( at least two of which were brought
and tried separately; (2) has been convicted of two violent sex offenses and one or
56. The information that may be disclosed by peace officers under Tier II includes: the offender's full name,
any known aliases, gender, race, physical description, photograph, date of birth, the crimes and dates of commission
that resulted in the offender's registration, the offender's address (which must be verified prior to publication), a
description and license plate number of the offender's vehicles or vehicles the offender is known to drive, the type
of victim targeted by the offender, relevant parole or probation conditions, and the offender's date of release from
confinement. Id. § 290(m)(2)(A)-(N) (amended by Chapter 908).
57. See id. § 290(m)(1)(A), (B) (amended by Chapter 908) (providing that this information could be released
to persons, agencies, or organizations the offender is likely to encounter including, but not limited to, "[plublic and
private educational institutions, day care establishments, and establishments and organizations that primarily serve
individuals likely to be victimized by the offender," or "[o]ther community members at risk").
58. See id. § 290(m)(4) (amended by Chapter 908):
The phrase "likely to encounter" means "(A) that the agencies, organizations, or other community
members are in a location or in close proximity to a location where the offender lives or is employed,
or that the offender visits or is likely to visit on a regular basis, and (B) the types of interaction that
ordinarily occur at that location and other circumstances indicate that contact with the offender is
reasonably probable".
Id.
59. See id. § 290(m)(7) (amended by Chapter 908) (noting that the law enforcement agency may disclose
information on an offender pursuant to this subdivision for as long as the offender is included in the list of offenders
set forth in California Penal Code § 290.4).
60. See id. § 290(m)(5) (amended by Chapter 908) (providing that the phrase "reasonably suspect" means
that "it is objectively reasonable for a peace officer to entertain a suspicion, based upon facts that could cause a
reasonable person in a like position, drawing when appropriate on his or her training and experience, to suspect that
a child or other person is at risk").
61. See id. § 290(m)(6) (amended by Chapter 908) (defining "at risk" to mean a person who "is or may be
exposed to a risk of becoming a victim of a sex offense committed by the offender").
62. Id. § 290(m)(1)-(7) (amended by Chapter 908).
63. Id. § 290(n) (amended by Chapter 90g).
64. See id. § 290(a)(2) (amended by Chapter 908) (listing all the crimes for which conviction requires the
offender to register with the state).
65. See id § 290(n)(1)(B) (amended by Chapter 908) (noting that "violent sex offenses" include: (I) Assault
with intent to commit enumerated sex offenses, except attempt to commit mayhem (California Penal Code § 220);
(2) rape (Penal Code § 261); (3) rape in concert (Penal Code § 264.1); (4) sodomy (Penal Code § 286); (5) child
molestation (Penal Code § 288); (6) oral copulation (Penal Code § 288a); (7) continuous sex abuse of a child (Penal
Code § 288.5); (8) foreign object rape (Penal Code § 289); (9) child molestation, as specified (Penal Code § 647.6);
and (10) infliction of great bodily injury during the commission of a sex offense (Penal Code § 12022.8)).
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more violent nonsex offenses,6 at least two of which were brought and tried
separately; (3) has been convicted of one violent sex offense and two or more violent
nonsex offenses, at least two of which were brought and tried separately; or (4) has
been convicted of either two violent sex offenses or one violent sex offense and one
violent nonsex offense, at least two of which were brought and tried separately, and
has been arrested on separate occasions for three or more violent sex offenses,
violent nonsex offenses, or associated offenses. 7
Chapter 908, under Tier I, provides offenders with a "washout" exception, or
circumstances under which a person will not be considered a "high-risk" sexual
offender. 68 Two such circumstances suspend application of the label. First, if the
offender's most recent conviction or arrest for an enumerated offense occurred more
than five years prior to the Department of Justice's high-risk assessment, excluding
periods of confinement, the offender will not be considered a "high-risk" sexual
offender.69 Second, if the offender notifies the Department of Justice that the offender
has not been convicted in the preceding fifteen years of an offense requiring sex
offender registration, and such information is verified by the Department, the "high-
risk" label will be deleted.70
2. Chapter 596: Chemical Castration
In addition to the passage of the community notification system, California's
legislators this year also passed a first-in-the-nation law--Chapter 596-calling for
the "chemical castration" of a small group of sex offenders who commit especially
heinous crimes against children.7' Specifically, Chapter 596 repeals previous
California law which provided the courts with the discretion to order a sex offender,
found guilty of carnal abuse of a female under the age of ten, to undergo an operation
66. See id. § 290(n)(1)(C) (amended by Chapter 908) (noting that "violent nonsex offenses" include: (1)
Murder (California Penal Code § 187), (2) voluntary manslaughter (Penal Ccde § 192(a)), (3) mayhem (Penal Code
§ 203), (4) torture (Penal Code § 206), (5) kidnaping (Penal Code § 207), (6) felony false imprisonment (Penal
Code § 236), (7) child abuse or endangerment (Penal Code § 273a(a)), (8) child abuse (Penal Code § 273d), (9)
arson (Penal Code § 451), and (10) attempted murder (Penal Code §§ 187 and 664)).
67. Id. § 290(n)(1XA)(i)-(iv) (amended by Chapter 908); see id. § 290(n)(1)(D) (amended by Chapter 908)
(noting that "associated offenses" include: (1) Felony sexual battery (California Penal Code § 243.4). (2) specified
obscene matter offenses (Penal Code §§ 311.1-.7), (3) indecent exposure (Penal Code § 314), (4) first degree
burglary (Penal Code § 459), (5) animal killing (Penal Code § 597), (6) stalking (Penal Code § 646.9), (7)
disorderly conduct offenses such as loitering in a public toilet (Penal Code § 647(d), (h) or (i)), (8) telephone
harassment (Penal Code § 653(m)), or (9) infliction of great bodily injury during commission of a felony (Penal
Code § 12022.7)).
68. Id. § 290(n)(1)(G); see SENATEFLOOR,COMMrrnmANALYSiSO1AB 1562, at 6 (Aug. 29, 1996) (using
the term "washout").
69. CAL. PENAL CODE § 290(n)(l)(G)(i) (amended by Chapter 908).
70. Id. § 290(n)(1)(G)(ii) (amended by Chapter 908).
71. Id. § 645 (amended by Chapter 596). See generally Jason Run:kel, Abuse It and Lose It: A Look at
California's Mandatory Chemical Castration Law, 28 PAC. W. 549 (1997) (giving a detailed analysis of the
constitutional issues raised by the passage of Chapter 596).
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for the prevention of procreation.72 In its place, Chapter 596 provides that any
offender found guilty of committing either: (1) Lewd and lascivious conduct by
force, violence, duress, menace, or fear of immediate unlawful bodily injury;73 (2)
oral copulation, whether by force or not;74 (3) forceful sodomy;75 or (4) penetration
of genital or anal openings with a foreign object, whether forceful or not,76 on any
child under thirteen years of age, may be punished by depo medroxyprogesterone
acetate (DMPA) treatment," upon parole, at the discretion of the judge.78 Upon a
second conviction, the punishment would become mandatory. 79 The treatment would
consist of weekly injections of DMPA, beginning one week prior to release, and con-
tinuing until the Department of Corrections demonstrates to the Board of Prison
Terms that it is no longer necessary.80 A person subject to this provision may elect
surgical castration in lieu of the DMPA treatment.8 With these new laws cracking
down on sex offenders now in place, the question becomes whether the wave of
reformation will effectively reduce the incidents of sex crime, or whether it will
come crashing down in failure, creating even more problems than before.
II. COMMUNITY NOTIFCATION
A. A Reversion to the Past-Is California 's Version of Megan's Law a Modern
Day Scarlet Letter?
In Colonial America, punishments designed to shame and humiliate were com-
monplace, with judges frequently handing down sentences ordering offenders to
wear lettered clothing, to be branded with irons, or stand in the pillory as a means of
publicizing their deviance. 2 For example, in 1656, in Plymouth, Massachusetts, a
72. 1996 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 596, sec 1, at 2711 (repealing CAL. PENAL CODE § 645); see 1923 Cal. Stat.
ch. 224, sec. 1, at 448 (enacting CAL. PENAL CODE § 645).
73. CAL. PENAL CODE § 288(b)(1) (West 1988 & Supp. 1997).
74. Id. § 288a(b), (d) (West 1988 & Supp. 1997).
75. Id. § 286(c), (d) (West 1988 & Supp. 1997).
76. Id. § 289(a), (j) (West 1988 & Supp. 1997).
77. See infra note 205 and accompanying text (noting that depo medroxyprogesterone acetate, commonly
known as Depo-Provera, is a widely used female contraceptive method). Chapter 596 refers specifically to the
imposition of medroxyprogesterone acetate (MPA) treatment for sex offenders, rather than the imposition of depo
medroxyprogesterone acetate (DMPA). CAL. PENAL CODE § 645 (amended by Chapter 596). The difference
between the two is in their form of administration-MPA is a tablet, while DMPA is injectable. Because the
committee analyses discussing Chapter 596 refer to the imposition of Depo-Provera, the injectable MPA, I will use
the abbreviation DMPA throughout this Legislative Note. See ASSEMBLY FLOOR, COMMITTEE ANALYStS OF AB
3339 at 3 (Aug. 30, 1996) (referring to the imposition of Depo-Provera under Chapter 596).
78. CAL. PENAL CODE § 645(a) (amended by Chapter 596).
79. Id. § 645(b) (amended by Chapter 596).
80. Id. § 645(d) (amended by Chapter 596).
81. Id. § 645(e) (amended by Chapter 596).
82. See Toni M. Massaro, Shame, Culture, and American Criminal Law, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1880, 1913
(1991).
19971 Criminal Procedure
woman was forced to wear on her sleeve a Roman B, cut out of ridd cloth, as punish-
ment for her blasphemous words.83 Similarly, in 1663, a Boston man was ordered to
don a sheet of paper on his back bearing the word "Drunkard" as punishment for his
drunkenness.84 And in 1638, again in Boston, a man was sentenced to wear a red V
on his chest in order to signify his viciousness.8 The theory behind such "Scarlet
Letter" punishments was that offenders humiliated before their community would
reshape their behavior to conform with the accepted moral code. 86Their effectiveness
was due, in part, to the close-knit communities of the colonial era, where the pos-
sibility of hiding one's shame in anonymity was unavailable 7
Although such penalties have long been criticized as ineffective and unacceptable
in today's less socially-intimate societies, 8 many modem courts across the country
have revitalized shame punishments in response to the frustrations plaguing prison
and parole.89 For example, in Florida, a man convicted of drunk driving was ordered
to place a bumper sticker on his car reading "CONVICTED DUI - RESTRICTED
LICENSE."9 More recently, in Boston, nine men arrested for soliciting sex from an
undercover police officer were ordered to shovel the filth piling up in the back alleys
of Chinatown, with media cameras and photographers documenting the event for all
to see.9 In Wisconsin, one judge ordered shoplifters to announce their shame from
in between a sandwich board---on which were written the words "I'M A THIEF." 92
Just as drunk drivers, "johns" soliciting prostitution, and shoplifters have been
recent targets for public humiliation, convicted sex offenders have found themselves
the subject of shame punishments as well. For example, in Oregon, a man convicted
of child molestation was ordered to place signs on the front door of his residence and
on the doors of his vehicle, reading, "DANGEROUS SEX OFFENDER - NO
CHILDREN ALLOWED. 93 Moreover, in Rhode Island, a judge ordered a man to
place the following four-by-six inch ad in the Providence Journal Bulletin: "I am
Stephen Germershausen. I am 29 years old .... I was convicted of child molestation
.... If you are a child molester, get professional help immediately, or you may find
83. Rosalind K. Kelley, Sentenced to Wear the Scarlet Letter: Judicial Innovations in Sentencing-Are They
Constitutional?, 93 DICK. L. REv. 759, 759 (1989).
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Bedarf, supra note 22, at 913.
87. Massaro, supra note 82, at 1912.
88. See Kelley, supra note 83, at 760 (stating that penologists have deemed colonial shame punishments
as archaic and unacceptable); see also Massaro, supra note 82, at 1884 (concluding that public shaming empha;izes
retribution, while lacking any other "positive community-expressive or community-reinforcing content").
89. See Massaro, supra note 82, at 1882 (noting that prison overcrowding and doubts about the approp-
riateness and effectiveness of incarceration have made imprisonment a harsh choice in many cases, while parole
is viewed by many judges as too lenient).
90. Goldschmitt v. State, 490 So. 2d 123, 124 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986).
91. Public Humiliation Used as Means to Deter Criminal Acts (NPR broadcast, June 10, 1996) (transcript
on file with the Pacific Law Journal).
92. Id.
93. State v. Bateman, 771 P.2d 314,322 (Or. Ct. App.) (en bane), cert denied, 777 P.2d 410 (Or. 1989).
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your picture and name in the paper, and your life under control of the state." 94 The
text was accompanied by the man's picture, just in case people did not know him by
name.95 Finally, in Louisiana, judges are given the discretion to order punishment
that may force sex offenders to affix signs, bumper stickers, handbills, or labeled
clothing to themselves or their property as a means of notifying the public of their
whereabouts.96
California's newly enacted community notification law, Chapter 908, while not
as severe as some of the forms of punishment described above, sanctions a similar
form of shame punishment, permitting law enforcement officers to disseminate the
identity and location of certain registered sex offenders to the public?7 While
legislators hope the new laws will decrease the number of sex offenses committed,
critics have suggested they are an ineffective, "knee-jerk" reaction to the increase of
public demands calling for safer communities in which our children must live, and
may even lead to increased problems for the community.9
B. Will Community Notification Laws Be Effective?
Community notification laws, such as Chapter 908, have been well received by
the public in recent years for two main reasons.99 First, the laws promise to empower
the public by arming them with information that can be used to fend off victimization
and relieve feelings of helplessness. 1°° Second, community surveillance, in con-
junction with police surveillance, of registered offenders ideally increases the
chances of capturing these criminals upon re-offense or, better yet, deters them from
re-offending altogether.'0 '
In contrast to the lofty expectations these laws raise stands their realities.
Realities that demonstrate their lack of effectiveness under fire. For example, laws
such as Chapter 908, in addition to empowering the community with knowledge, can
enrage it through fear as well.'02 Armed with knowledge of an offender's identity and
location, those wishing to expel offenders from their neighborhoods may resort to
94. Massaro, supra note 82, at 1881.
95. Id.
96. LA. CODE CRITM. PRoc. ANN. art. 895(H)(2) (West 1984 & Supp. 1997).
97. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 290, 290.4 (amended by Chapter 908).
98. See, e.g., Kimberly J. McLarin, Trenton Races to Pass Bill on Sex Abuse, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 30, 1994,
at BI (describing how New Jersey legislators passed Megan's Law by the New Jersey State Assembly without
holding its customary committee hearings on the bill); Jenny A. Montana, An Ineffective Weapon in the Fight
Against Child SexualAbuse: New Jersey's Megan's Law, 3 J.L. & PoL'Y 569, 574 (1995) (arguing that community
notification laws such as Megan's Law neither prevent incidents of child sexual abuse nor make communities safer,
but rather create consequences that hinder efforts to deter sex offenders from re-offending).
99. See Bedarf, supra note 22, at 906.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. See id. at 907 (explaining that community notification laws transform what was once an "abstract
anxiety" into an "identifiable threat" where people "become woried that this particular offender will attack again").
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vigilantism--creating crime to deter crime.'0 3 Similarly, because these laws only
inform the public as to those offenders who have already been convicted and pose
a certain base-level threat to society, first time offenders, offenders failing to register,
and less threatening offenders who may become violent will remain unknown1
0 4
Thus, a false sense of security is fostered among those who believe they are aware
of the danger and can prevent any harm. Finally, community notification places a
label-a badge of shame if you will--on offenders who have already served their
time, depriving them of the ability to reintegrate into society10 5 Ultimately, this
ostracism creates sexual offender outcasts who have a greater chance of reverting to
their prior tendencies. t°6
1. The Possibility of Vigilante Justice
Sex offenders commit heinous crimes-many times against the most innocent
of victims, our children. Their acts justifiably provoke public outrage, disgust, and
hate.'(' Chapter 908 will inevitably feed these emotions and create a volatile situation
where members of the community, armed with information and looking either to get
revenge or to expel the offender, may resort to acts of vigilantism.'08 Such was the
case in Washington in 1993. Just prior to the release of convicted child rapist Joseph
Gallardo, Washington law enforcement officials posted fliers in Gallardo's intended
neighborhood describing him as "an extremely dangerous untreated sex offender
with a very high probability for re-offense."' 9 The flyer also listed several of
Gallardo's "deviant sexual fantasies," including "torture, sexual assault, human
sacrifice, bondage and the murder of young children." ""°Members of the community,
after receiving this information, held a protest rally on the day before Gallardo was
scheduled to be released.'' Hours later, Gallardo's house was burned to the ground
by an arsonist 12 A similar outburst occurred several years later in Phillipsburg, New
Jersey, where two men-a father and his son-after being notified by police of a
certain sex offender residing in the neighborhood, broke into the man's house and
103. See infra notes 107-17 and accompanying text (discussing some of the incidents of vigilantism that have
occurred in response to community notification).
104. See infra notes 118-22 and accompanying text (addressing the problems that will likely result from the
failure to identify these groups of offenders).
105. See infra notes 123-26 and accompanying text (warning that such ostracism of a released sex offender
may actually incite further crime).
106. Id.
107. See Montana, supra note 98, at 577 n.39 (quoting one person as saying "there are few things viewed
as more obscene and that provoke as much public outrage as sex crimes against children").
108. See id. at 575-76 (noting that community notification laws "heighten community fears concerning the
threat of convicted sex offenders and create an environment that is ripe for acts of vigilantism").
109. Doug Conner, Did Flyer on Sex Offender's Release Invite Vigilantism?, L.A. TIMEs, July 22, 1993, at
Al.
110. Vigilante Justice Is No Answer to Sex Crimes, SEATTLETTES, July 13, 1993, at B4.
111. Id.
112. Id.
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attacked the person inside" 3 Their only mistake was they had attacked the wrong
man. 4 Another incident took place on March 5, 1996, when a New York school
district superintendent, via mass mailing, identified a sex offender who had moved
into the community upon his release from prison." 5 Following the mailing, the
individual was fired from his job, his family was harassed, and an attempt was made
to break into his home."
6
Perhaps the most frightening aspect of all these cases is that they are not
uncommon. A 1993 study conducted by the Institute for Public Policy in Washington
concluded that up to twenty-six percent of sex offenders subject to Washington's
community notification law had been harassed. 17 California can expect a similar
response to the implementation of Chapter 908.
2. Offenders Who Maintain Anonymity
Community notification laws promote a false sense of security for those who
believe that because police will notify them of any dangerous offenders in their area,
they will be able to protect their families by keeping an eye on potential predators. "8
The problem with creating this state of mind is that many offenders will remain
anonymous and may take advantage of those who let down their guard. Several
groups of offenders will escape the grasp of Chapter 908, and California's com-
munities must beware.
Chapter 908 cannot afford protection from first time offenders or offenders who
have not yet been caught and registered" 9 because what is unknown cannot be
warned against. In addition, offenders failing to register and offenders registering
under a phony address can beat the system and avoid community notification.
20
Registration depends on the cooperation of the offenders themselves, any many
would rather dodge the police than face the consequences posed by public noti-
fication.12 ' Finally, because not all states have adopted community notification laws,
many offenders can seek refuge in other states, remaining hidden from watchful
113. Malcolm Gladwell, N.J. Law on Released Sex Offenders Proves Problematic, WASH. PoST, Jan. 16,
1995, at A6.
114. Id.
115. Doe v. Pataki, 940 F. Supp. 603,609 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
116. Id.
117. Katherine Seligman, Molesters' "Scarlet Letter" Bill; Is Public Disclosure Invasion of Privacy?, S.F.
EXAM., Mar. 6, 1994, at Al.
118. See McLarin, supra note 98, at BI (reporting that New Jersey Attorney General Deborah T. Poritz,
before the passage of Megan's Law, cautioned that the community notification system included in the bill "cannot
guarantee protection" and that it would be foolish to "send a message that gives a false sense of security").
119. See Bedarf, supra note 22, at 907.
120. See Montana, supra note 98, at 590-91 (noting the difficulty many law enforcement agencies have in
locating a sex offender once the state has lost track of him due to the lack of resources).
121. Id. at 591.
1997/ Criminal Procedure
eyes.'2 Thus, the problem only migrates from one community to the next; it never
really goes away.
3. Wearing a Badge of Infamy
When law enforcement officials notify a community of the presence of a sex
offender, they are, in essence, branding that offender with a lifelong badge of shame:
most likely, a badge of shame from which ostracism will follow. This ostracism
prevents offenders who have already served their sentence from reintegrating into
society, a result that harms not only the offender, but the community as well.
First, for those sex offenders who have been properly rehabilitated so that they
no longer pose a threat to society, community ostracism can lead to a reversion back
to engaging in the behavior that evoked society's rage in the first place.'t This
ostracism spawns a certain mentality which ultimately leads to a rise in the number
of offenses committed, as offenders rationalize that because they are already being
punished as an outcast, there is no reason to fight temptation in an effort to
conform.' 24 Second, because pedophiles generally manifest their difficulties relating
to adults by seeking out children, both socially and sexually, ostracizing an offender
may actually reinforce that attraction.125 Again, the rate of offense would increase
rather than decrease. Finally, in an effort to avoid being labeled altogether, many
offenders are likely to secure pleas to lesser crimes rather than plead guilty to a sex
crime. 26 The offenders are back on the street without treatment, anonymous and
ready to victimize another innocent child.
122. Md. at 579; see Robert Davis & Deeann Glasmer, Sex Offender Notification: Help or Harassment?, USA
TODAY, July 16, 1993, at 2A (reporting that after neighbors burned down his house, convicted sex offender Joseph
Gallardo moved to New Mexico, a state with no community notification requirements); see also Dealing with Sex
Offenders, N.Y. TiIiEs, Aug. 15, 1994, at A14 (noting that the problem may even be heightened in the areas of
refuge as offenders are driven from family and friends who may be the only ones who can help control their
behavior).
123. See Andy Newman, Megan, Her Law and What It Spawned, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 25, 1996, at 1. A
convicted sex offender was quoted as saying,
[ilf you're going to treat a sex offender so that at some point you feel safe for him to go out into society
and live again ... you have to set up a system so that he can live. If a man can't find a place to live, or
if he finds a place to live and gets verbally harassed. [sicl It's like, if you back somebody far enough
into a comer, they're going to react. And the sex offender's reaction is going to be to commit another
sex offense.
124. See Bedarf, supra note 22, at 910-Il (professing that a community's rejection of an offender's attempts
at rehabilitation may become a self-fulfilling prophecy for that offender).
125. Montana, supra note 98, at 583.
126. Kenneth Crimaldi, "Megan's Law": Election-Year Politics and Constitutional Rights, 27 RUTGERS L.J.
169, 173 (1995).
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C. Constitutional Challenges: Ex Post Facto Punishment?
In an article appearing in the ABA Journal, Washington Post columnist Bruce
Fein concedes that "Megan's Law is no panacea [and that] its impact on the
incidence of crime may prove marginal."' 27 Fein professes that such "marginal im-
provement is welcome when little else is working" and cautions critics to "pause
before unleashing their constitutional attacks. ' 8 Yet his inference that constitutional
scrutiny be considered an "attack" is misleading. Addressing the constitutionality of
any law in no way directly attacks the policy or emotions behind its enactment.
Because crimes committed by sex offenders evoke a powerful emotional response,1
29
it is important to remember the necessity for the separation of legal analysis from
emotional influence. A New Jersey court articulated the point well, noting that its
assessment of the constitutionality of Megan's Law was "not a balancing of the rights
of sex offenders against the rights of their victims [but rather] an analysis of the
breadth of the rights which every American holds and the constitutional limitations
on a government's power to infringe them."'
30
Community notification laws, such as Megan's Law, have been scrutinized under
various constitutional provisions, including the Eighth Amendment protection against
cruel and unusual punishment, the Due Process Clause, the right to privacy, and the
Equal Protection Clause.33 However, the most common challenge-and thus the
focus of this Legislative Note-has been that they constitute ex post facto
punishment.
1 32
Article I, sections 9 and 10 of the U.S. Constitution prevent both federal and state
governments from enacting ex post facto laws, or laws that have a retroactive
punitive effect.133 The Ex Post Facto Clause covers specifically: (1) Every law that
changes the definition of a crime, so that an act, innocent when committed, now
subjects a person to criminal liability; (2) every law that aggravates a crime, so as to
make it a greater crime than when committed; (3) every law that changes the
punishment for a crime and inflicts a greater punishment on an offender after the
127. Bruce Fein, Megan's Law: When a Sex Offender Moves In, Is There a Duty to Warn the Community?,
81 A.B.A.J. 38 (1995).
128. Id.
129. See Quindlen, supra note 3, at 13 (stating that the feeling created by sex offenses on children is "part
revulsion, part rage, as equal as a high fever").
130. See W.P. v. Poritz, 931 F. Supp. 1199, 1203 (D.N.J. 1996).
131. See generally Ryan A. Boland, Sex Offender Registration and Community Notification: Protection, Not
Punishment, 30 NEw ENG. L. REv. 183 (1995) (discussing these and other constitutional issues raised by Megan's
Law); Simeon Schopf, "Megan's Law": Community Notification and the Constitution, 29 COLUM. J.L. & Soc.
PROBS. 117 (1995) (same); G. Scott Rafshoon, Comment, Community Notification of Sex Offenders: Issues of
Punishment, Privacy, and Due Process, 44 EMoRY LJ. 1633 (1995) (same).
132. See, e.g., Doe v. Pataki, 940 F. Supp. 603 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); W.P. v. Poritz, 931 F. Supp. 1199 (D.NJ.
1996); State v. Ward 869 P.2d 1062 (Wash. 1994).
133. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, §§ 9, 10.
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crime is committed; and (4) every law that alters the rules of evidence, allowing for
a conviction on lesser evidence than previously required.' 34
The purpose behind the Ex Post Facto Clause is to minimize the risk that
legislators--driven by political pressures to please their constituents-will be
tempted to use retroactive legislation to punish unpopular groups or individuals.' 35
In Cummings v. Missouri,36 the Supreme Court noted that the Ex Post Facto Clause
was adopted because "the people of the United States ... have manifested a deter-
mination to shield themselves and their property from the effects of those sudden and
strong passions to which men are exposed.' 37
Chapter 908 requires specified registered sex offenders who have been deemed
as presenting an adequate risk to society to be publicly exposed-even humiliated-
upon their release from prison.'33 Therefore, it may be considered in violation of the
third category of laws prohibited by the Ex Post Facto Clause of the Constitution,
increasing the punishment for a crime after the offender has already committed the
crime and been punished.
There is no dispute that Chapter 908 applies retroactively, so the crucial issue
becomes whether it constitutes a punishment or a regulation. The distinction is
important because while states generally may freely regulate individuals in order to
further the good of society, the U.S. Constitution limits their ability to punish their
citizens. 39
The California Legislature has clearly evidenced its intent that Chapter 908 be
classified as regulatory rather than punitive in nature. In the purposes and findings
clause of Chapter 908, the legislature notes "[tihis policy of authorizing the release
of necessary and relevant information about serious and high-risk sex offenders to
members of the public is a means of assuring public protection and shall not be
construed as punitive. ' ' 4
This statement of intent may be highly determinative of whether Chapter 908 is
classified by the courts as regulatory or as punitive. Such was the case in Rise v.
Oregon14t where the Ninth Circuit focused solely on the Oregon Legislature's regu-
latory intent in concluding that the "obvious purpose" of the Oregon statute requiring
convicted murderers and sex offenders to provide blood samples for the state's DNA
data bank was to assist law enforcement officials, and that the statute was therefore
not punitive in nature, and not in violation of the Constitution. 42 Similarly, the
134. Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 390 (1798).
135. .W.P., 931 F. Supp. at 1206.
136. 71 U.S. 277 (1866).
137. Cummings, 71 U.S. at 322.
138. CAL. PENAL CODE § 290 (amended by Chapter 908).
139. Note, Prevention Versus Punishment: Toward a Principled Distinction in the Restraint of Released Sex
Offenders, 109 HAsV. L. REV. 1711, 1716 (1996) [hereinafter Prevention Versus Punishment].
140. 1996 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 908, sec. 1, at 4128 (stating the legislature's findings and declarations).
141. 59 F.3d 1556 (9th Cir. 1995).
142. Rise, 59 F.3d at 1562.
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Illinois Supreme Court, in People v. Adams, 43 determined that legislative intent was
dispositive when deciding the nature, either regulatory or punitive, of a legislature's
act.'"
Under Rise and Adams, it appears as though Chapter 908, because of the legis-
lature's clearly stated intent, would be classified for constitutional purposes as regu-
latory and thus, not violative of the Ex Post Facto Clause. However, this relatively
simple standard of "legislative intent wins" is not the prevailing method for making
the prevention/punishment determination.t45
The prevailing method for analyzing whether a statute constitutes a punishment
or a regulation is more complex and originates from the United States Supreme Court
case Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez"46 The Kennedy court tailored several factors
into a balancing test by which an act of Congress could be deemed penal or regu-
latory in nature. The factors are: (1) Whether the sanction involves an "affirmative
disability or restraint"; (2) whether it "has historically been regarded as punishment";
(3) whether it operates only upon a finding of scienter; (4) whether it "promotes the
traditional aims of punishment," such as retribution and deterrence; (5) whether the
behavior to which it applies is already a crime; (6) whether it can be assigned an
alternative purpose other than punishment; and (7) whether it "appears excessive in
relation to the alternative purpose assigned." 47 Several courts have used the Kennedy
analysis to determine the nature of community notification laws similar to Chapter
908, emerging with opposing results.
The Supreme Court of Washington, in State v. Ward, 48 concluded, after
engaging in a Kennedy analysis, that its registration statute which allowed for law
enforcement agencies to disseminate information to the public'49-a community
notification provision-was regulatory in nature.' 50 The Ward court, under the first
Kennedy factor, held that Washington's registration statute did not involve an af-
firmative disability or restraint. 5' The appellant argued that the dissemination of
registrant information created hostility among members of the public, amounting to
an additional punitive effect on the registrants. Despite this argument, the court
ruled that because the statute, on its face, requires the disclosing agency to first have
some evidence that the offender poses a threat to the community before releasing the
information, the effect of the statute is to prevent future harm rather than punish past
143. 581 N.E.2d 637 (LI. 1991).
144. Adams, 581 N.E.2d at 641.
145. See Prevention Versus Punishment, supra note 139, at 1717.
146. 372 U.S. 144 (1963); Prevention Versus Punishment, supra note 139, at 1717.
147. Kennedy, 372 U.S. at 168-69.
148. 869 P.2d 1062 (Wash. 1994).
149. Ward, 869 P.2d at 1069.
150. Id. at 1066.
151. Id. at 1069.
152. Id.
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offenses. t13 Further, under the second factor, the court determined that, historically,
registration has not been regarded as punishment, but rather as a traditional
governmental method of disclosing relevant information to law enforcement
officials, with public safety being the goal. t 4 Finally, under the seventh Kennedy
factor, Ward ruled that the statute was not excessive in relation to its nonpunitive
purpose.55
While the Ward court utilized the Kennedy factors to ultimately conclude that
Washington's sex offender registration and notification statutes were regulatory in
nature, a federal district court in New Jersey used the same Kennedy factors to reach
the opposite conclusion. In Artway v. Attorney General,56 a New Jersey federal
district court used the seven Kennedy factors to determine that New Jersey's Sex
Offender Registration Act was punitive in nature.
Under the first Kennedy factor, the Artway court concluded that public
notification involves an affirmative disability or restraint: the offender's employ-
ability and ability to reintegrate into the community were said to be hampered when
the state disseminates information ensuring that his "former mischief... shall remain
with him for life."' 57 Continuing its analysis, under the second Kennedy factor, the
Artway court concluded that the public dissemination element of Megan's Law has
been regarded, historically, as punitive. 5 8 The court equated the punishing social
stigma that followed offenders branded in earlier times with the stigma that attaches
to an offender subject to Megan's Law. 59 In analyzing whether the New Jersey
statute promotes the traditional alms of punishment-the fourth Kennedy factor-the
Artway court reasoned that, because the statute empowers the public by increasing
their awareness, the traditional deterrent element of punishment exists as offenders
weary of being caught are less likely to re-offend.' 6° The Artway court went on to
conclude that the behavior to which Megan's Law applies is indeed already a crime,
and that it goes beyond the traditional law enforcement objectives by providing the
public with otherwise unobtainable information.' 6' Thus, the court categorized the
fifth and sixth Kennedy factors as evidencing a more punitive nature.62 Finally,
under the seventh Kennedy factor, the Artway court concluded that the stated legis-
lative intent for Megan's Law as a regulatory measure concerned with public pro-
tection is outweighed by the foregoing punitive factors, and that the effect of the
153. Id. at 1070.
154. Id. at 1072.
155. Id. at 1073.
156. 876 F. Supp. 666 (D.NJ. 1995).
157. Artway, 876 F. Supp. at 689.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 690; see id. (noting that Megan's Law would "deputize" every member of the registrant's
community and thus would be the ultimate deterrent).
161. Id. at 691-92.
162. Id.
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community notification provision, if not its purpose, is ultimately punitive in
nature. 63
From the cases outlined above, it is unclear whether Chapter 908-if analyzed
using Kennedy-would be labeled as punitive or regulatory.
A different test, one more recent than Kennedy, indicates that community
notification statutes-such as Chapter 908-may stand less chance of receiving a
"regulatory," rather than a "punitive," categorization by a reviewing court. This new
test for determining whether a statute constitutes nonpunishment was set forth by the
Third Circuit, upon review of the Artway ruling.'6' The court criticizes the Kennedy
factors as "too indeterminate and unwieldy to provide much assistance."165 However,
the court falls short of dispensing with them entirely. According to the Third Circuit,
a measure must pass a three-prong analysis--(l) Actual purpose, (2) objective pur-
pose, and (3) effect-to constitute nonpunishment.' 66 The first prong asks whether
it was the legislature's aim to punish. 67 If the legislature's intent was to regulate, and
the restriction on the offender is merely a "relative incident" to that regulation, the
law will pass the first prong.' 68 The second prong-the legislature's objective
purpose-is divided into three subparts. The first asks whether the law can be
explained solely by a remedial purpose. 69 If not, then it constitutes a punishment.170
The second prong questions whether a historical analysis suggests that the measure
has been traditionally regarded as punishment.'71 If so, and the text or legislative
history does not show a nonpunitive nature, the measure must be considered
punitive. 7 2 Third, a court must determine whether the law serves both punitive and
regulatory goals. 73 If so, then the court must ask whether the punitive purpose
historically has complimented the regulatory purpose, and whether the measure
operates in its "usual" manner, consistent with its historically mixed purposes. 74
Finally, if the two purpose tests are satisfied, the court must then look to the effects
of the measure, and determine whether the negative repercussions-regardless of
how they are justified-are great enough to be considered punishment.7 5 If a
measure fails any one of these prongs, it will be considered punitive in nature.
The Third Circuit, in their review of Artway, set out the test but failed to apply
it to the public notification provisions of New Jersey's Megan's Law, ruling that the
163. Id. at 692.
164. See Artway v. Attorney General, 81 F.3d 1235 (3rd. Cir. 1996).












issue was not ripe for review. 76 However, the U.S. District Court for the District of
New York, in Doe v. Pataki,'"7 recently applied a similar test to determine whether
New York's community notification statute was regulatory or punitive in nature.
The Pataki court concluded that New York's community notification provisions
were punitive in nature and thus violated the Ex Post Facto Clause. 178 In reaching this
conclusion, the court examined the legislature's intent behind the act, the design of
the act, the history of similar punishments, and the effects of notification . 79
Pataki determined that even though the New York legislature's stated intent was
to protect, other indications, including remarks made by members during debates,
pointed to a more punitive intent."* This punitive intent was evidenced by some of
the remarks offered by members of the New York State Legislature to describe sex
offenders, labeling them as "'depraved,' 'the lowest of the low,' 'animals,' and 'the
human equivalent of toxic waste,"' who, because of their crimes, deserved whatever
punishments were imposed.' 8'
Looking at the design of New York's community notification laws, the Pataki
court concluded that it "contain[ed] classic indicia of a punitive scheme.' '182 For
example, the act allows for a judge to determine the level of notification, 83 with
many of the risk factors used in this calculation relating to the crime, to its
circumstances, or to the offender's criminal history.'
14
The Pataki court went on to compare community notification in New York to
two sentencing measures that have been historically regarded as punitive in nature:
stigmatization and banishment.-' The court found several disturbing similarities. It
said, "today's lawmakers-like their colonial counterparts-are counting on 'the
invisible whip of public opinion' to deter the sex offender from future wrong-
doing."
186
Finally, in looking at the effects of community notification, the Pataki court was
further convinced of the act's punitive nature. The court held that community notifi-
cation involved an affirmative disability or restraint, hindered an offender's ability
to reintegrate safely and effectively into society, and served traditional goals of
punishment-deterrence, retribution, and incapacitation.' 87
176. Id. at 1251-52.
177. 940 F. Supp. 603 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
178. Pataki, 940 F. Supp. at 604-05.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 605.
182. Id. at 623.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 624-26.
186. Id. at 625.
187. 1d. at 626-29.
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Ultimately, whether Chapter 908 is deemed regulatory or punitive in nature
depends on the test adopted by California's courts and the Ninth Circuit to analyze
its constitutionality. The foregoing analysis shows that even though California's
Legislature may have expressly provided that its intent in enacting Chapter 908 was
to serve a regulatory purpose, its punitive "effect" or "design" might take precedence.
The trend in New York, as evidenced by the Pataki case, suggests that Megan's Law,
and similar community notification provisions, may constitute ex post facto punish-
ment. That same trend may eventually eliminate Chapter 908.
I. CHEMICAL CASTRATION
While Chapter 908 may resemble a modem day scarlet letter, shaming an
offender into compliance with the law, Chapter 596 mirrors something much darker.
Chapter 596, and its provisions mandating the chemical castration of certain two-time
sex offenders, resembles ancient codes, such as the Germanic "barbarian codes," and
the Twelve Tables of Roman Law, that profess punishment through mutilation.""
One Middle Assyrian regulation, for example, punished any man guilty of kissing
a woman by slicing off his lip.8 9 Another Mesopotamian code contained a provision
that threatened, "if a child should strike his father, they shall cut off his hand."' °
While these specific methods of punishment by mutilation have been abandoned in
today's modern, "civilized" world, Chapter 596 shamefully has revitalized a punish-
ment not too far removed.
A. Blinded by Emotion: Did California's Legislators Enact Chapter 596 at the
Expense of Logic and Reason?
The idea of chemical castration through the use of DMPA treatment has found
rigorous support among the public and the California Legislature, in large part due
to the justifiable loathing of sex offenders.' 9 ' Susan Carpenter McMillan, president
of the Women's Coalition in Pasadena was recently quoted as saying that "[t]here is
no cure for this disease, and we have got [sic] to begin someplace .... I don't care
about the rights of serial child molesters. To me, they've lost their rights once they
rape, molest and violate small children."' 92 Similar comments were made by Dee
Jepsen, president of Enough is Enough-a group dedicated to educating the public
about the detrimental effects of child pornography-who stated that "our first respon-
188. See James Q. Whitman, At the Origins of Law and the State: Supervision of Violence, Mutilation of
Bodies, orSetting of Prices? 71 CH.-KENTL. REV. 41,45-47 (1995) (describing how the law and the state derived,
in part, from ancient codes that often called for punishment through mutilation).
189. Id. at 47.
190. Id. at 46-47.
191. See infra notes 192-95 and accompanying text (recounting several comments made that evidence the
hate and disregard society has for sex offenders).
192. Ed Bond, Should Repeat Sex Offenders Be Castrated?, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 24, 1996, at B3.
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sibility as a decent society is to protect our children.' 93 She went on to explain that
even though it may be difficult to exact harsh penalties on sex offenders, for the sake
of society it must be done or else we risk being run by those who disobey the law.'94
Even Governor Wilson gave a stern warning to offenders in his support of the law.
He cautioned, "I have a message for those skulking in the shadows .... You better
stay in the shadows or leave this state. We will not tolerate your conduct."'
9 5
Much of the enthusiasm for chemical castration stems from the fact that in
several European countries which have utilized the treatment, recidivism rates for sex
offenders are as low as 2%, whereas in the U.S., nearly half of all sex offenders are
re-arrested.196 One Danish study following over 900 castrated sex offenders for
periods as long as thirty years reported a recidivism rate of only 2.2%.197 In contrast,
a group of noncastrated offenders had a recidivism rate of over 40%.'9' Similarly, in
Switzerland, a five-year study of 121 castrated sex offenders found a recidivism rate
of only 7.4%, while men not undergoing the treatment re-offended 52% of the
time.' 99
Even in the absence of these European studies, it is no surprise that Chapter 596
has received unmitigating support, because anything less might be construed as
advocating the protection of sex offenders. In the legislative game, when society's
emotions run high, constituent pressures often force legislators into hasty
decisions. 200 In the case of chemical castration, California's legislative response to
these pressures, without adequate consideration of the consequences, may create
unanticipated problems in the future. Medically, without the proper studies
monitoring DMPA's long-term effects on men, unanticipated side effects may spark
lawsuits where the criminal ends up suing his punisher.20' Socially, DMPA treatment
-in the absence of conjunctive psychotherapy-may create a false sense of security,
193. Cheryl Wetzstein, Texas Child Molester's Case Reignites Decades-Old Debate; 'First Responsibili y
... Is to Protect Our Children,' WASH. TMEs, Apr. 17, 1996, at A2.
194. Id.
195. It's Now the Law: 'Chemical Castration' of Molesters; Weekly Injections of Depo.Provera Would Be
Mandatory for Offenders After a Second Conviction, ORANGE COUNTY REG., Sept. 18, 1996, at B5.
196. See ASSEmLY FLOOR, COMmITrEE ANALYSIS OF AB 3339, at 3 (Aug. 30, 1996) (noting that the actual
rate of re-offense in the U.S. is probably higher than 50% since sex crimes often go unreported).
197. SENATE FLOOR, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 3339, at 4 (Aug. 15. 1996).
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. See generally Franklin E. Zimring, Populism, Democratic Government, and the Decline of Evpert
Authority: Some Reflections on "Three Strikes" in California, 28 PAC. LJ. 243 (1996) (observing that California's
"Three Strikes" law originated from marginal pressure groups and passed through the legislature with little expert
scrutiny from governmental specialists or scholars).
201. See infra notes 204-19 and accompanying text (identifying the process through which Depo-Provera
proceeded before FDA approval, and noting that while many studies have measured the effects of Depo-Provera
as a contraceptive in women, little is known about the long-term side effects of the drug when administered to men
as a treatment for sex crimes).
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as the procedure may prove ineffective for most, if not all, offenders. 2? Legally,
constitutional challenges may block the implementation of these treatments
altogether, with valuable time and resources going to waste? 3
B. Medical Questions: Effects of DMPA Treatment-the Known and the
Unknown
Medroxyprogesterone acetate (brand name Provera) in the injectable form (depo
medroxyprogesterone acetate, or DMPA) is commonly known as Depo-Provera.2
4
While today the drug is approved for use as a female contraceptive in more than
ninety countries and is taken by more than 15 million women worldwide,2 5 its
potential effects on humans once created fear. In 1974, the FDA granted the
Upjohn Company-the manufacturer of Depo-Provera-approval to market the drug
as a female contraceptive.207 However, less than two months later, the FDA stayed
that approval in light of concerns raised by Congress that Depo-Provera may increase
the risk of cervical cancer.208 Several years later, in 1978, the FDA withdrew its
approval entirely based on evidence indicating that the drug had caused mammary
tumors in beagles.20 The fear was that this effect may manifest itself in humans.
2t0
That fear, however, has since subsided, as this cancerous connection has proven
unique to the beagle.211 In 1992, long after its introduction, DMPA was re-approved
for use in this country as a female contraceptive.
21 2
While many studies on Depo-Provera as a contraceptive have been com-
pleted-assessing and measuring its side effects when used as such 21 -the drug has
202. See infra notes 220-40 and accompanying text (developing the idea that Depo-Provera is not an effective
treatment for all types of offenders).
203. See infra notes 241-74 and accompanying text (analyzing DMPA treatment as a possible violation of
the right to privacy).
204. ASSEMBLY FLOOR, COMMrTrEE ANALYSIS OF AB 3339, at 3 (Aug. 30, 1996).
205. ROBERT A. HATCHER ET AL., CONTRACEPTivETE HNOLOGY 285 (16th ed. 1994).
206. See Sidney A. Shapiro, Scientific Issues and the Function of Hearing Procedures: Evaluating the FDA's
Public Board of Inquiry, 1986 DUKE LJ. 288, 314 (detailing the drawn-out processes that the FDA went through




210. See HATCHER ET AL., supra note 205, at 310.
211. Research and Regulatory Approval of Injectable Contraceptives, POPULATION REP., Aug. 1995, at 3
(explaining that the WHO Collaborative Study of Neoplasia and Steroid Contraceptives provided epidemiologic
evidence that humans and animals differ in their responses to hormones).
212. Id.
213. See Shari Roan, Weekly Injections of Depo-Provera for Repeat Child Molesters Becomes Law Jan. 1,
But Critics Question Whether It's Effective and Free of Side Effects for Men, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 26, 1996, at El
(recognizing common side effects experienced by women taking depo-provera as including irregular bleeding,
weight gain, leg cramps, depression, hot flashes, insomnia, and blood clots).
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not yet been cleared by the FDA as an effective treatment for violent sex offenders,
and has not been studied adequately for such a purpose.
14
What is known is that, in the short-term, when administered to men, Depo-
Provera suppresses testosterone production, with varying degrees of negative effect
on genital functioning, including a decrease in spermatogenesis, erection, and
ejaculation 5 However, in the long-term, little is known about the effects of Depo-
Provera when administered to men. 2t6 Some believe its long-term noncontraceptive
use may produce atypical sperm and ultimately lead to deformed children.
21 7
By imposing this unknown, possibly with grave long-term effects, on a group of
people in society, whether they are criminals or not, California's legislators have
abandoned their sense of morality in favor of satisfying society's demand for
action.218 One critic equated forcing Depo-Provera on offenders without first
knowing its full effects as "akin to the experimentation of Third Reich doctors in
Nazi Germany. 219 While this may be somewhat of an exaggeration, the premise is
not far off.
C. Social Questions: Will DMPA Treatment Be Effective on All Offenders?
In an article appearing in the American Journal of Criminal Law, Edward A.
Fitzgerald examined the effects of DMPA treatment when administered to sex
offenders. He began by categorizing sex offenders into four types.22' Type I offen-
ders are those that deny either the commission or criminal nature of their crimes.
222
Type II offenders confess to their crimes, but place the blame on some nonsexual or
nonpersonal force, such as drugs or alcohol. 223 Type III offenders are violent
criminals whose motivation to offend stems from nonsexual gain, such as anger or
214. Daniel C. Tsang, A Sex-Crime Law for the Dark Ages; Justice: Chemical Castration Won't Stop Rape
and Child Abuse, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 18, 1996, at B9; see Max Vanzi, Assembly OKs Castration Dnig for Molesters,
L.A. TME, Aug. 31, 1996, at Al (noting that a spokesman for the FDA in Washington said that Depo-Provera is
not on the approval list as a castration agent and that although physicians may prescribe certain drugs for purposes
other than the approved purposes listed for approval, it is unclear whether criminal justice officials have similar
authority).
215. William Green, Depo-Provera, Castration, and the Probation of Rape Offenders: Statutory and
Constitutional Issues, 12 U. DAYTON L. REv. 1, 6 (1986).
216. Roan, supra note 213, at El; see Edward Fitzgerald, Chemical Castration: MPA Treatment of the Seviual
Offender, 18 Am. J. CRIM. L. 1, 9 (1990) (noting that even though DMPA is effective in reducing deviant sexual
behavior, the long-term effects of the treatment are unknown).
217. Green, supra note 215, at 6 n.31.
218. See Roan, supra note 213, at El (noting that there is an ethical imperative that the full effects of MPA
treatment be understood before it is imposed on anyone).
219. Tsang, supra note 214, at B9.
220. See generally Fitzgerald, supra note 216.
221. See id. at 4.
222. Id.
223. id.
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power. 4 Finally, Type IV offenders are the paraphiliacs who exhibit a pattern of
sexual arousal, erection, and ejaculation.2
The paraphiliac's pattern of sexual arousal originates in puberty, with the sexual
fantasy having been reinforced by orgasm many times. 2 6 Sex offenses recognized
as paraphilias include pedophilia, exhibitionism, transvestitism, voyeurism, sexual
sadism, sexual masochism, and other psychosexual disorders including some forms
of rape.'7
Fitzgerald concludes that DMPA treatment is only effective when administered
to Type IV offenders-the paraphiliacs. 2Y 8 In men, DMPA causes a decrease in the
level of testosterone produced in the testicles, which consequently reduces his sexual
imagery, providing relief from an incessant sexual fantasy.229 Because DMPA treat-
ment acts as a suppressant on an offender's sexual drive, paraphiliacs-whose crimes
are sexually driven-will be the only group of offenders whose deviant behavior will
decrease due to the treatment. 30 Fitzgerald notes that the paraphiliac undergoing
DMPA treatment is freed from his compulsive sex drive, his spontaneous erections,
and his fear of relapse.23' With those vices lifted, he becomes more amenable to
psychotherapy, and poses a minimal threat to society 3
2
As for the other three types of offenders categorized by Fitzgerald, the con-
nection between DMPA treatment and a lower rate of recidivism is tenuous. Because
DMPA only suppresses the drive for sex, crimes not driven by sex but by some other
motivating factor, such as aggression, exhibition, or psychosis, would be unaffected
by DMPA treatment. 2 3 Collier Cole, a psychologist who has treated nonviolent sex
offenders with Depo-Provera for more than fifteen years agrees, noting that "each
and every person won't respond to Depo-Provera. If the motivation isn't sex, if it's




227. Id. at 4-5.
228. Id. atS.
229. Id. at 6-7.
230. SENATE FLOOR, COMMrrrEE ANALYSIS OF AB 3339, at 4 (Aug. 15, 1996); Fitzgerald, supra note 216,
at 16.
231. See Fitzgerald, supra note 216, at 16.
232. Id.
233. Jeff Stryker, Sentenced to Drugs: 'Chemical Castration' Will Not Solve the Problem of Repeat Sex
Offenders, RECORDER, Sept. 4, 1996, at 4. Fred Berlin, director of the National Institute of the Study, Prevention
and Treatment of Sexual Trauma in Baltimore said:
[Chapter 596] does not include an evaluation to see if an individual is among the subset group of
offenders for whom this might work. I think there is a role for [DMPA treatment] for people whose
sexual appetites are of the sorts that can cause suffering. But if one lacks social conscience or is
antisocial, no medicine in the world will help that.
Roan, supra note 213, at El.
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Klaas), giving him Depo-Provera won't solve the problem. This drug won't give
people a conscience."
Even those offenders potentially amenable to DMPA treatment-the paraphiliacs
-may be unaffected in the absence of conjunctive psychotherapy-something
Chapter 596 fails to provide3 5 In fact, while the drug may be lauded by some
therapists as a vital treatment tool, its use alone is condemned.2 6 One critic believes
the best place to begin treatment of sex offenders is while they are still in prison. Sue
North, a lobbyist for the California Psychiatric Association said, "[l]earned behavior
is very difficult to change" and that "[t]he best shot we have for changing someone's
behavior is working intensively with that person while they are away from circum-
stances that.., got them into trouble. ' 2a7 That way, the offender is cured before he
ever has a chance at freedom.
Therapy that works, whether done in or out of prison, involves group or
individual sessions where the offender learns to recognize what triggers the behavior
-whether it be loneliness, boredom, depression, drugs, alcohol, or proximity to
children.238 Some offenders learn to recognize their triggers and can be taught
strategies to avoid them.239 DMPA alone cannot teach an offender what drives his
behavior and how to avoid those urges for a lifetime. The stories of successful
chemical castration as an effective recidivism reducer for sex offenders in Europe,
which have lent such overwhelming support to proponents of Chapter 596, involve
only willing participants and are combined with various forms of psychotherapy
2 40
-a fact California's legislators chose to ignore.
Chapter 596 and its failure to include provisions that would (1) screen offenders
in order to differentiate between those whose crimes were driven by sex and those
whose crimes were driven by hate, and (2) mandate conjunctive psychotherapy for
those offenders who are deemed amenable to such treatment increases the likelihood
the DMPA treatment will be wholly ineffective. These deficiencies ultimately will
create a false sense of security among the public who may assume unknowingly that
DMPA will work on all offenders, regardless of their criminal motive. When the
public lets their guard down and feels secure, the offenders that the state has cleared
for release remain potent predators and may capitalize on this comfort.
234. Katherine Seligman, Chemical Castration Costly, Won't Work, Experts Insist; Drug Not Effective on
All Who Takelt, Therapists Say, S.F. EXAM., Sept. 15, 1996, at Cl.
235. See Jen M. Olsen, Chemical Castration Used in Europe with Some Success: Some States in U.S. Are
Considering Similar Programs, PRESS-ENTERPRISE (Riverside, CA), Aug. 31, 1996, at AI5 (noting that Heidi
Hansen, Chief Physician at Denmark's jail for sex offenders, urged a patient's need for extensive psychotherapy).
236. Seligman, supra note 234, at Cl.
237. Dan Bernstein, Chemical Castration Law OK'd, SACRAMENTO BEE, Sept. 18, 1996, at Al.
238. Seligman, supra note 234, at Cl.
239. Id.
240. Id.
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D. Legal Questions-Invasion of an Individual's Right to Privacy?
The U.S. Constitution contains no express provision granting an individual's
right to privacy. However, the Supreme Court has recognized such a right as implicit
within the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and, therefore,
applicable to state action.24 t This privacy right has been interpreted by the Court as
protecting an individual's right to refuse medical treatment22 as well as his right to
procreate. 243 Chapter 596, which imposes chemical castration as a condition of parole
for certain two-time sex offenders, may ultimately be found as violating one or both
of these privacy rights.244
1. The Right to Refuse Medical Treatment
Critics may contend that Chapter 596 interferes with an individual's right to
refuse medical treatment-a right recently articulated in the California Supreme
Court decision Thor v. Superior Court (Andrews).2 45 In Thor, the court was faced
with the issue of whether an individual's right to exercise bodily control was suf-
ficiently broad so that the individual may decline life-sustaining treatment.246Howard
Andrews, a prisoner and real party in interest in the case, had rendered himself a
quadriplegic in a fall while incarcerated, leading to his dependence on medical
personnel for the maintenance of all of his routine bodily functions? 47 Several
months following the injury, Andrews began refusing to eat?48 Thor, a licensed
physician and staff member of the Vacaville Medical Center where Andrews was
confined, sought a court order that would allow him to tube-feed Andrews against
his will, to keep him alive.249 The court denied Thor's request. 25°On appeal,
California's highest court agreed with the lower court's denial, stating that "under
California law a competent, informed adult has a fundamental right of self-deter-
mination to refuse.., medical treatment of any form irrespective of the personal
consequences."25 Chapter 596 and its mandatory parole condition imposing DMPA
treatment on two-time sex offenders convicted of certain crimes against children
likely violates this fundamental right of refusal.
241. Fitzgerald, supra note 216, at 40. See generally Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
242. See infra notes 245-57 and accompanying text.
243. See infra notes 258-74 and accompanying text.
244. See Mike Lewis, 'Castration' Law Set for Challenges, DAILY RECORDER (Sacramento, Cal.), Sept. 20,
1996, at 1 (noting that opponents of Chapter 596 say the law is an "open target" for legal challenge, foremost under
an individual's right to privacy).
245. 5 Cal. 4th 725, 855 P.2d 375, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d 357 (1993).
246. Thor,,5 Cal. 4th at 732, 855 P.2d at 378, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 360.
247. Id. at 732, 855 P.2d at 379, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 361.
248. Id.
249. Id. at 733, 855 P.2d at 379, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 361.
250. Id.
251. Id. at 732, 855 P.2d at 378, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 360.
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Proponents of Chapter 596 probably will argue that the decision to undergo
DMPA treatment upon parole is voluntary and based on informed consent, however
critics suggest that such a decision is more coercive than consensual?5 2 Offenders
faced with the decision between further imprisonment or treatment with DMPA
really have no decision at all.253 Further, because the long-term effects of DMPA are
still unknown, the state cannot adequately inform the offender of all the potential
risks involved with accepting the treatment.254 Considering the coercive aspect
behind any decision made to achieve freedom through parole, and the fact that the
long-term effects of DMPA are still unknown, the decision by a sex offender to
accept such treatment is truly uninformed and nonconsensual. Such a decision can
be considered in violation of the right to refuse medical treatment as set forth in
Thor.
In addition, proponents of Chapter 596 may contend that the law falls within one
of the four exceptions to the right to refuse medical treatment provided in the Thor
decision. In Thor, the court noted four state interests that might act as countervailing
considerations to the right to bodily autonomy: (1) Preserving life, (2) preventing
suicide, (3) maintaining the integrity of the medical profession, and (4) protecting
innocent third parties .25 The fourth category-the protection of innocent third
parties-arms proponents of Chapter 596 with the most powerful weaponry to
combat the holding of Thor25
6
While DMPA treatment may be an effective cure for offenders whose crimes
stemmed from an aberrant sexual fantasy-so called paraphiliacs-and while there
may be a compelling state interest to administer the drug to such offenders falling
within this category, there can be no such interest for those offenders whose crimes
were committed out of violence, rage, or the need for power and control, as DMPA
treatment cannot curb such tendencies.5 7 Chapter 596 fails to screen offenders to
determine which of them would be receptive to DMPA treatment, and so, fails to
protect society from the offenders on parole, undergoing DMPA, who still pose a
threat to society. Thus, Chapter 596 does not fall within this exception to the rule
stated in Thor. Although the intent may be to protect, the actual effect will fall short.
252. Green, supra note 215, at 16.
253. Id.
254. Id. at 15.
255. Thor, 5 Cal. 4th at 738, 855 P.2d at 383. 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 365.
256. See Fitzgerald, supra note 216, at 49 (noting that if the convicted paraphiliac is granted probation, the
state's interest in protecting the public from future offenses warrants chemical castration by DMPA).
257. See supra notes 222-25 and accompanying text (discussing the four categories of sexual offenders).
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2. The Right to Procreate
The United States Supreme Court first espoused a right to procreation under the
Fourteenth Amendment in their 1942 decision Skinner v. Oklahoma 5 8 Specifically,
in Skinner, Justice Douglas held that an Oklahoma statute mandating sterilization for
"habitual criminals" was a deprivation "of a right which is basic to the perpetuation
of a race-the right to have offspring."5 9 Some years later, in Griswold v. Con-
necticut,2 ° the Court formally articulated the right to procreation as inherent within
an individual's fundamental right to privacy.26 With Justice Douglas again delivering
the opinion, the Court struck down a Connecticut statute which prohibited any person
from using any "drug, medicinal article or instrument for the purpose of preventing
conception," holding that married individuals have a constitutionally protected right
to marital privacy regarding decisions involving the use or nonuse of contra-
ception.262 In Eisenstadt v. Baird, 3 the Court extended the application of the right
to procreation and privacy to unmarried persons as well, thereby protecting any
individual.2 4
Because Chapter 596 mandates a drug treatment known to cause impotence in
some men, with no provision allowing for a decrease in dosage if such impotence
arises, it is most likely violative of an offender's right to procreate. State-imposed
DMPA treatment-which is known to have a negative effect on sex drive26 5-
unconstitutionally involves the state in the regulation of the enjoyment of marriage
and family.2" Such a fundamental right 67 may only be restricted when the govern-
ment can articulate a compelling interest and show that their means of achieving that
interest is narrowly tailored, with no alternate means.2 68 While the interest in pro-
tecting society in general, especially our children, from sexual offenders is
undoubtedly compelling, the imposition of DMPA treatment on offenders is not the
least restrictive means of achieving this goal.269 In fact, DMPA has been criticized
as not even being rationally related to this end,270 as the drug-when administered
258. 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
259. Skinner, 316 U.S. at 536.
260. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
261. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 479; Scott J. Jebson, Conditioning a Woman's Probation on Her Using Norplant:
New Weapon Against Child Abuse Backfires, 17 CAMPBELL L. REv. 301, 311 (1995).
262. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485-86.
263. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
264. Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 443.
265. Green, supra note 215, at 24.
266. Id.
267. See Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541 (stating that "marriage and procreation are fundamental to the very
existence and survival of the race").
268. See generally Skinner, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (using strict scrutiny to analyze the constitutionality of an
Oklahoma statute that discriminated between offenders and impaired the fundamental right to procreate).
269. Green, supra note 215, at 25.
270. Id.
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to sex offenders without conjunctive psychotherapy or a prescreening process for
receptibility-may be wholly ineffective.27'
Proponents of Chapter 596 may make several arguments to counter this claim.
First, they may contend that DMPA does not in fact interfere with a person's right
to procreate because a person subjected to the injections does not become impotent,
but rather only "erotically apathetic." 272 Such erotic apathy, they argue, does not
interfere with one's ability to procreate.273 Second, proponents may argue that the use
of DMPA is only a temporary barrier to the right to procreation, as any impotence
disappears when treatment is stopped, and thus no more hinders the right to procreate
than does imprisonment 74
However, because the long-term effects of DMPA are still unknown and because
there is no provision in Chapter 596 calling for the cessation of DMPA after a certain
time, imposing Depo-Provera on an offender may lead to a future inability to
procreate. With such an effect still unknown and at least within the realm of pos-
sibility, the right to procreate is violated by Chapter 596.
IV. CONCLUSION
The passage of Chapters 908 and 596 represents the culmination of a wave of
reformation to California's sexual offender laws that began several years ago in
response to an ailing system of registration. The question whether the wave will
eradicate sex crimes in California or create further difficulties can only be answered
with time. However, all indications suggest that these new community notification
and chemical castration laws are an ineffective and unconstitutional means of pro-
tecting the public from sex offenders. Chapter 908-California's community
notification law-not only unjustly increases an offender's punishment after the fact,
by branding him with a humiliating badge of shame, but fails to adequately protect
society as well. Members of the public who rely on Chapter 596 to warn them of any
and all danger will be left with a false sense of security. Chapter 908-California's
chemical castration law-imposes an unknown medical treatment on offenders, with-
out first screening them to determine who will be receptive and who will not. Even
those amenable to DMPA may still not be affected, as the law fails to provide for any
form of conjunctive psychotherapy. The result, again, will leave the public feeling
protected when, in reality, they are not.
Chapters 908 and 596, in addition to their separate inadequacies, fail to work in
harmony with one another. Specifically troubling is the legislature's failure to include
provisions within Chapter 908 that would create an exception for offenders falling
271. Id.; see supra notes 220-40 and accompanying text (explaining the deficiencies of Chapter 596 when
imposed on offenders without a prescreening search for receptibility and without conjunctive psychotherapy).
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within Chapter 596. If the legislature were so confident in the effectiveness of
DMPA treatment, society would need no warning of those offenders receiving
injections. Similarly, offenders opting for surgical castration are subject to the com-
munity notification provisions in Chapter 908. Is such a warning truly necessary?
Currently, the law as written seems to believe so.
In a recent article appearing in the Sacramento Bee, Assemblywoman Barbara
Alby said of Chapter 596 and its potential applicants, "I could give a rip about
castrating a child molester. I could do it with a [sic] dull hedge clippers. My concern
is that there's only a small group of people that this is effective against. There are
other reasons for assaults against women and children besides sexual desire." 275 This
statement by Assemblywoman Alby reflects all that is wrong with the new sexual
offender laws. Alby's rage and disgust with sex offenders in general and the brutal
acts they commit, evidenced by her vengeful desire to castrate them with dull hedge
clippers, clouds her logic that such a solution will only work on a select few
offenders, if any. Such haste in the face of reason seems to have choked the entire
California legislature that voted to implement Chapters 908 and 596. Our only hope
is that the negative implications rippling throughout society as a whole are not too
severe for future legislation to cure.
APPENDiX
Code Sections Affected
Penal Code §§ 290, 290.4 (amended).
AB 1562 (Alby); 1996 STAT. Ch. 908
Penal Code § 645 (amended).
AB 3339 (Hoge); 1996 STAT. Ch. 596
275. Mary Lynne Vellinga, 'Castration' Law Under Fire: Drug Injections for Molesters Called 'Cartoon
Solution,' SAC RAMENo BEE, Feb. 4, 1997, at Al.
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Ending a Prisoner's Right to Have Personal Visits
Jason 0. Runckel
I. INTRODUCTION
"Prison walls do not form a barrier separating prison inmates from the pro-
tections of the Constitution."' However, as a result of lawful incarceration, many
rights and privileges afforded to citizens under the Constitution are withheld from
prison inmates.2 Over the past three decades, rights retained by California's state
prisoners have changed dramatically.3 In 1968, the California Legislature codified
the "Civil Death" doctrine which stripped inmates of all their civil rights during their
imprisonment.4 In 1975, the California Legislature repealed the Civil Death doctrine
and enacted a Penal Code section on "Civil Rights of Prisoners" into its Penal Code.5
Under prior law, a California state prison inmate had some enumerated rights,
including the right to personal visits, written into the statute.6
I1. VIsrrATION AS A RIGHT
Under existing law, a person sentenced to imprisonment in a California state
prison may only be denied such rights reasonably related to legitimate penological7
interests.' As enumerated by California statute, a prisoner's civil rights include the
right to own property,9 correspond confidentially with any member of the state bar
1. Turner v. Safely, 482 U.S. 78, 84 (1987).
2. Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, 433 U.S. 119, 125 (1977); see id. (stating that
confinement and the needs of the penal institution impose limitations on constitutional rights, including those
derived from the First Amendment, which are implicit in incarceration); see also infra note 33 and accompanying
text (noting various rights and privileges withheld from prisoners).
3. See Mona Halprin, Comment, Constitutional Rights in Prison: The Standard of Review in California,
16 PAC. L. 1077 (1985) (discussing the evolution of prisoners' constitutional rights in the California state prison
system).
4. 1968 Cal. Stat. ch. 1402, sec. 2, at 2763 (amending CAL. PENAL CODE § 2600).
5. 1975 Cal. Stat ch. 1175, sec. 3, at 2897 (enacting CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 2600-2601).
6. Id. at 2897-98.
7. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1135 (6th ed. 1990) (defining "penology" as the science of prison
management and rehabilitation of criminals).
8. CAL PENAL CODE § 2600 (West Supp. 1997).
9. See id. § 2601(a) (amended by Chapter 132) (stating that property ownership includes all written and
artistic material produced or created by that person during confinement). But see id. (authorizing the Department
of Corrections to restrict or prohibit personal or real property sales or conveyances which are made for business
purposes).
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or holder of public office,10 receive and read all legal materials," and initiate civil
actions.12 Further, state prisoners' civil rights also include the right to marry, create
a power of appointment, and make a will.1
3
Hm. PERSONAL VISITS AS A PRIVILEGE
Prior to the enactment of Chapter 132, state prisoners had an enumerated civil
right authorizing them the right to have personal visits.'4 Chapter 132 changes prior
law by deleting from the enumerated civil rights of a state prisoner the right to have
personal visits.'5 Case law on the rights of inmates under the California Constitution
clearly permit the right to confidential access to an attorney, the right to own or
transfer property, and the right to marry.16 However, under Chapter 132, the Director
of the Department of Corrections 17 would have "greater control of inmate activities
such as visitation."' 8
10. See id. § 2601(b) (amended by Chapter 132) (enabling prison authorities to inspect incoming mail during
these sessions to search for contraband).
11. See id. § 2601(c)(1) (amended by Chapter 132) (allowing prisoners to read newspapers, periodicals,
and books accepted for distribution by the United States Postal Office); see also id. (allowing authorities to exclude
obscene publications, writings, or any matter of a character tending to incite forms of violence or concerning
gambling or a lottery). But see id. § 2601(c)(2) (amended by Chapter 132) (stating that nothing in this section
restricts the right of prison authorities to open and inspect all packages received by an inmate, as well as limiting
the number of publications an inmate may have in the prison).
12. See id. § 2601(d) (amended by Chapter 132) (allowing civil action, but subjecting prisoners to a three
dollar fee for the filing of civil actions to be collected by the Department of Collections).
13. Id. § 2601(t)-(h) (amended by Chapter 132).
14. See 1975 Cal. Stat. ch. 1175, sec. 3, at 2897-98 (enacting CAL. PENAL CODE § 2601) (authorizing the
Department of Corrections to make any restrictions that are necessary for the reasonable security of the institution);
see also CAL CODE REGS. tit. XV, § 3173 (1996) (setting forth the general visiting regulations including proof of
identification, fingerprints, and vehicle inspection).
15. Compare 1994 Cal. Legis. ch. 555, sec. 2, at 2379-80 (amending CAL. PENAL CODE § 2601) (authorizing
the Department of Corrections to provide any restrictions on personal visitation rights for the reasonable security
of the institution) with CAL. PENAL CODE § 2601 (amended by Chapter 132) (deleting a right to have personal visits
from the list of prisoners' rights).
16. See, e.g., Payne v. City of L.A., 17 Cal. 3d. 908, 924, 552 P.2d 565, 576, 132 Cal. Rptr. 405, 416 (1976)
(holding that the "denial of appointed counsel to an indigent prisoner, when no other relief will preserve his right
to access to the courts, is constitutionally impermissible"); In re Carrafa, 77 Cal. App. 3d 788, 789, 143 Cal. Rptr.
848, 849 (1978) (concluding that denying general visitation rights to an inmate's wife does notjustify the denial
of the inmate's marriage request); In re Dickinson Estate, 51 Cal. App. 2d 638, 639, 125 P.2d 542, 543 (1942)
(stating that a person who has been sentenced to serve a term less than life imprisonment is capable of inheriting
real estate).
17. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 5054 (West 1982) (providing the Director of the Department of Corrections
with the supervision, management, and control of the state prisons including the responsibility for the care, custody,
treatment, training, discipline, and employment of persons confined therein).
18. SENATE FLOOR, CoMMrITEE ANALYSIS OF SB 1221, at 2 (June 24, 1996); see Rich Harris, Prisoners
Lose Right to Conjugal Visits as Wilson Wins Victory, SAN DtEGo UNioN-TRm., July 9, 1996, at A3 (stating that




Persons incarcerated in correctional institutions do not lose all of their con-
stitutional protections.1 9 However, the constitutional rights retained by prisoners are
limited by their inmate status.20 The extent of protection offered by the California
Constitution differs from that offered by the United States Constitution. 2' Unlike the
United States Constitution, the California Constitution specifically provides a right
to privacy. 22 However, although the right to reasonable visitation opportunities is an
essential part of the rehabilitative process,2 "locating a constitutional anchor for it
is a formidable task."24 In Kentucky Department of Corrections v. Thompson z the
United States Supreme Court held that an inmate's interest in "unfettered visitation"
is not directly guaranteed by the Due Process Clause.26 Although the Supreme Court
clearly stated that inmates do not have a constitutional right to unfettered visits, it did
not answer the question of whether there is a constitutional right for prison inmates
to have a program of reasonable visitation.27
Without specific guidance from the United States Supreme Court, lower federal
courts are not in agreement about whether there is a right of visitation and, if one
does exist, what are its limitations.2s Many federal courts have concluded, with little
analysis, that there is no absolute constitutional right to prison visitation. 29 Although
many courts conclude that visitation is not an absolute constitutional right, most fall
to address whether prisoners have a right to reasonable visitation programs."0
19. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520,545 (1979). See generally Halprin, supra note 3 (discussing constitutional
rights retained by prisoners).
20. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539,555-56 (1974).
21. Halprin, supra note 3, at 1081.
22. Compare U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 with CAL CONST. art. I, § 1.
23. See CAL. CODEREGS. tit. XV, § 3170(a) (1996) (describing inmate visiting as a means to establish and
maintain meaningful family and community relationships); see also AmERIC N BAR ASSOCIATION, STANDARD3 FOR
CRMNAL JusTIcE STANDARD 23.6.2 cmt. 23.82 (1986) (asserting that "because almost all inmates ultimately will
be returned to the community at the expiration of their terms, it is important to preserve, wherever possible, family
and community ties"); NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND GOALS
CORRECTION, PROCEEDINGS OFTHE NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE 66 (1973) (recording testimony
from Ellis C. MacDougall, Commissioner, Georgia Department of Offender Rehabilitation, Atlanta, Ga.
"Corrections Task Force" stating that 98 out of every 100 people put into incarceration eventually come back into
the community).
24. 2 MICHAEL MuSHLIN, RIGHTS OF PRISONERS § 12.01, at 88 (2d ed. 1993).
25. 490 U.S. 454 (1989).
26. Thompson, 490 U.S. at 460; see Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 224 (1976) (rejecting the notion that
any change in confinement conditions resulting in substantial impact on a prisoner is sufficient to invoke the
protections of the Due Process Clause).
27. MusHLIN, supra note 24, at 88-89.
28. Id. at 89; see supra notes 29-33 (listing cases).
29. See, e.g., White v. Keller, 438 F. Supp. 110, 115 (D. Md. 1977) (concluding that prsoners do not have
a right to visitation, without analysis).
30. Id.; see, e.g., Evans v. Johnson, 808 F.2d 1427, 1428 (11th Cir. 1987) (holding that a "convicted
prisoner has no absolute constitutional right to visitation' because visitation is a privilege "subject to the discretion
of prison authorities, provided that the visitation policies of the prison meet legitimate penological objectives");
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On the other side of the coin, many courts have found a constitutionally protected
visitation entitlement under several theories.3' Although substantive due process does
not guarantee inmates an absolute right to have visits, there does appear to be an
independent constitutional entitlement found in the fundamental constitutional right
to privacy in family relationships when prisoners seek to visit with their families.?2
Even though a right to privacy in family relationships exists, it, like all rights of
prisoners, is not absolute and can be taken away as long as the deprivation is not for
unreasonable or arbitrary reasons.33 Even if there is no independent constitutional
right to have visits, a constitutionally protected liberty interest may be created under
state law.34 Moreover, even if there is no right for prisoner visitation contained in the
federal Constitution, prisoners may find a right to visitation as an independent entitle-
ment under a state constitution.35 In addition, one federal court held that the Eighth
Amendment protection against cruel and unusual punishment is implicated when
visiting restrictions are excessively restricted.
3 6
Bellamy v. Bradley, 729 F.2d 416, 420 (6th Cir. 1984) (concluding that "prison inmates have no absolute
constitutional right to visitation").
31. See MUSHLN, supra note 24, at 89 (discussing some possible arguments where visiting rights fall under
constitutional protection).
32. Id. at 90; see Laaman v. Helgemoe, 437 F. Supp. 269, 322 (D.N.H. 1977) (stating that "visitation
privileges may be curtailed as a punishment for disciplinary infractions" but "may not be so great as to infringe
upon inmates' First Amendment rights to family association").
33. MUSHLIN, supra note 24, at 92; see Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 826 (1974) (illustrating that prison
visitation can be restricted for institutional security reasons, but that those restrictions must be imposed because of
the obvious institutional needs and not arbitrarily drawn); see also Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494,
503 (1977) (promulgating that the Constitution protects the sanctity of the family because the institution of family
is deeply rooted in the nation's history and tradition); N.A.A.C.P. v. Alabama. 357 U.S. 449,460 (1958) (declaring
that "it is beyond debate that the freedom to engage in association for the advancement of beliefs and ideas is an
inseparable aspect of the "liberty" assured by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment"); Mayo v.
Lane, 867 F.2d 374, 375 (7th Cir. 1989) (suggesting that the right to come together for the purpose of expressing
ideas may be broad enough to encompass meetings and communication between family and friends); Hardway v.
Kerr, 573 F. Supp. 419, 427 (W.D. Wis. 1983) (asserting that the value of face-to-face visits cannot be replaced
by phone calls or letters).
34. See Kentucky Dep't of Corrections, 490 U.S. at 461 (declaring that "state law may create enforceable
liberty interests in the prison setting"); id. (concluding that in order for visitation to become an enforceable state-
created liberty interest, it is necessary to closely examine the language of the relevant statute or regulation); see also
Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 247 (1983) (stating that if the language places substantive limitations on
official discretion then a liberty interest is created which cannot be taken away without due process protections).
35. See MUSHIN, supra note 24, at 92 (stating that even if there is no right to visit under the federal
Constitution, either as an independent right or as a state-created liberty interest, there may be a right under state
constitutional law); see also Donahue v. Fair Employment & Hous. Comm'n, 13 Cal. App. 4th 350, 363 n.7, 2 Cal.
Rptr. 32, 39 n.7 (1991) (announcing that California must independently determine the scope of a claim asserted
under its constitution); William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90
HARV. L. REV. 489, 495 (1977) (proclaiming that state courts are increasingly "construing state constitutional
counterparts of provisions of the Bill of Rights as guaranteeing citizens of their states even more protection than
the federal provisions, even those identically phrased").
36. See Laaman, 437 F. Supp. at 322 (concluding that a total denial of visits would violate the Eighth
Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment). But see Toussaint v. McCarthy, 597 F. Supp.
1388, 1413 (N.D. Cal 1984) (ruling that visitation restrictions placed on segregated inmates which do not deprive
an inmate of all visits and accords most inmates contact visits does not violate the Eighth Amendment).
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Although there has been some constitutional concern regarding the extent to
which visitation privileges can be restricted, the Supreme Court has identified four
relevant factors which must be proved to establish the unreasonableness of a prison
regulation.37 Courts should consider the following: (1) Whether a "valid, rational
connection" exists between the regulation and the legitimate interest advanced to
justify it; (2) whether alternative means for exercising the asserted right remain
available; (3) whether accommodation of the asserted right will adversely affect
guards, other inmates, and allocation of the prison generally; and (4) whether an
obvious alternative to the regulation exists that fully accommodates the "prisoner's
right at de minimis cost to valid penological interests.""
"The Supreme Court's decision in Thompson represents a continued restriction
of the due process rights of prisoners., 39 "It further demonstrates that protected
liberty interests in prisoners will only arise from state statutes and regulations."
4
"Generally, federal and state prison administrators promulgate the regulations which
govern the extent of prisoners' rights."'4t1 In the past, these officials have exercised
almost unfettered discretion in this area of prison administration 
2
In the Ninth Circuit, the burden of proof is placed on the prisoner to demonstrate
the unreasonableness of a prison regulation which infringes upon their constitutional
rights.4 3 Furthermore, until Chapter 132, California was the only state which granted
its inmates personal visits as a right.4
37. Turner v. Safely, 482 U.S. 78,89-91 (1987). See generally Colette G. Matzzie & Charles Jones, Twenty.
Second Annual Review of Criminal Procedure: United State Supreme Court and Courts ofAppeals 1991-92, 81
GEO. L J. 1621 (1993) (discussing prisoners' rights and the reasonableness of prison regulations).
38. Turner, 482 U.S. at 89-91.
39. Joseph P. Messina, Case Comment, Kentucky Dep't of Corrections v. Thompson: The Demise of Pro.
tected Liberty Interest Under the Due Process Clause, 17 NEW ENG. J. ON CRlM. & CiV. CONFINEMENT 233, 258
(1991).
40. Messina, supra note 39, at 258-59; see id. (stating that the Court will not inquire into any actual prison
practices, nor will it consider whether any actual expectations of liberty on the part of prisoners arise); see also
Kentucky Dep't of Corrections, 454 U.S. at 46 (holding that protected interests in prisoners will be determined,
almost entirely, by the statute's mandatory language).
41. Jacqueline B. DeOliveira, Comment, Marriage, Procreation and the Prisoner: Should Reproductive
Alternatives Survive During Incarceration?, 5 TOtRO L. REV. 189 (1988).
42. J. GOBERT & N. COHEN, THE RiGHs o F PRisONERS 7-9, 12-14 (1981); see Virginia L. Hardwick,
Punishing the Innocent: Unconstitutional Restrictions on Prison Marriage and Visitation, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 275,
275 (1985) (illustrating that administrators have the power to control every aspect of a prisoner's life, including the
food eaten, the work done, and the time and manner of recreation); see also 17 Op. Att'y Gen. 565, 565 (1983)
(stating that prisoners confined in state prisons under federal or state sentences are subject to rules and regulations
promulgated by the several states).
43. Casey v. Lewis, 4 F.3d 1516, 1520 (9th Cir. 1993); see Song Hill, Casey v. Lewis: The Legal Burden
Is Raised; The Physical Barrier Is Spared, 25 GOLDEN GATEU. L. REv. 1.21 (commenting that "the Ninth Circuit
places a practically unattainable burden on prisoners to establish that a prison regulation violate- their
constitutionally protected rights").
44. SENATE FLOOR, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 1221, at 3 (June 24, 1996); see id. (reporting that
Califomia has the most liberal policies regarding inmate rights).
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V. CONCLUSION
Advocates of Chapter 132 claim that by making visitation a privilege the
Department of Corrections can teach inmates that they are accountable for their
actions by showing inmates that there is a penalty for breaking the rules and a
privilege for following them.45 In addition, the incentives of visiting privileges en-
hance prison security and make it easier for guards to manage prisoners.46 Opponents
of Chapter 132 argue that all prisoners have the right to contact visits with family and
friends,47 and that the Corrections Department will now use its authority to drastically
limit prisoners' visits.48 Moreover, many prisoners' rights groups oppose Chapter
132 because it has the potential to take away all types of visitation, from contact
visits with family members to conjugal visits. 49 Although Chapter 132 broadly grants
the Department of Corrections almost absolute power over all prisoners' visitation
rights, it is this author's opinion that Chapter 132 will survive constitutional scrutiny
and remain the law.
APPENDIX
Code Section Affected
Penal Code § 2601 (amended).
SB 1221 (Calderon); 1996 STAT. Ch. 132
45. Id.
46. Family Visits for Inmates Upheld. L.A. TIMES, May 26, 1995, at A33.
47. Society's Interests and Prisoner Rights, S.F. CHRON.. June 4, 1996, at A18.
48. Harris, supra note 18, at A3.
49. See id. (stating that Chapter 132 will take away conjugal visits from many prisoners, especially sex
offenders and violent criminals).
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Limiting Parole: Required Consideration of Statements and
Recommendations Received by the Parole Board
Mike A. Cable
On October 1, 1993, a knife-wielding intruder invaded a young girl's slumber
party in the middle of the night.' After ordering the three twelve-year-old girls to the
floor, the invader abducted one of the girls, Polly Klass, and drove away.2 Sub-
sequently, the man strangled Polly to death because he was afraid he would go back
to prison if he let her go home.3 Perhaps even more reprehensible than this gruesome
crime, however, is that the abduction and murder could have been avoided; prison
authorities had released Richard Allen Davis on parole just three months before he
murdered Polly Klass. 4 Moreover, parole officials downgraded Davis to a lower risk
parolee two weeks after the murder occurred.5 Stories such as this spawn public
outrage, causing legislatures to react by limiting the availability of parole.6
I. INTRODUCTION
Fear of increasing crime and moral decay has led to public resentment toward
criminals.7 Moreover, the public views early release programs as revolving doors that
1. See Ken Hoover, Polly's Killer Guilty on All Counts, S.F. CHR:ON., June 19, 1996, at AI [hereinafter
Hoover, Polly's Killer] (describing how Richard Allen Davis broke into Polly Klass's house with a knife during
a slumber party); Key Dates in Klass Case, FRESNO BEE, July 30, 1996, at A3 (reporting that on October 1, 1993,
Davis broke into Polly's house with a knife during a slumber party).
2. Hoover, Polly's Killer, supra note 1, at Al; see id. (explaining that Davis ordered the girls to the floor,
gagged Polly's two friends, then left taking Polly with him).
3. Michael Dougan, Klass Suspect Said Drugs Led to Killing, S.F. EXAM.. Apr. 24, 1996, at Al; see id.
(reporting that Davis confessed in vivid detail how he had strangled Polly); see also Hoover, Polly's Killer, supra
note 1, at Al (stating that Davis was convicted for the murder of Polly).
4. See Hoover, Polly's Killer, supra note 1, at Al (reporting that Davis was paroled three months before
he murdered Polly); RichardAllen Davis' Life ofCrime, S.F. CHRON., Aug. 6, 1996, at AlI (stating that Davi , was
released on parole on June 27, 1993).
5. Ken Hoover, Defense Opens in Klass Case, S.F. CHRoN., May 29, 1996. at A13; see id. (reporting that
Davis's parole agent downgraded Davis on October 15, 1993 to a status for a less dangerous offender).
6. See infra notes 7-11 and accompanying text (describing public frustration with crime and early release
programs, and the responses of various legislatures to this frustration).
7. See Juvenile Justice Initiative Supported by Vast Majority, PHoENiX GAzErrm, July 18, 1996, at B4
(reporting that public frustration with violent crime in Phoenix has led to political consistency favoring legislation
that is tough on juvenile crime); see also Kirk Loggins, State Turns Out Justice White, TENNEsSEAN, Aug. 2, 1996,
at IA (explaining that Justice White was removed from the Tennessee Supreme Court because she was "soft-on-
crime"); Eric Miller, Sure as Shootin', It's Arpalo's Show, ARI. REPUBLIC, Jan. 24, 1996, at Al (stating that the
nationally known, "tough-on-crime" sheriff, has an extremely high approval rating in Arizona polls); Slice of Life,
TMEs LONDON, Mar. 4, 1995, at *2, available in part 1995 WL 7653109 (copy on file with the Pacific Law
Journal) (declaring that California's "Three Strikes" measure was passed because of public frustration with
increasing crime).
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dump criminals into the streets only to commit more crimes! Legislatures have
responded to the public disfavor of criminals by establishing longer prison terms 9 and
restricting early release programs.10 One program that legislatures and the public
have severely criticized is parole." Although parole was first developed as a
humanitarian means of safely integrating prisoners back into society, 2 the current
goal of legislators is to limit the parole system. 3
The California Legislature has recently followed this trend by enacting specific
guidelines that require the Board of Prison Terms (Board) to consider comments and
recommendations concerning a prisoner's parole. 4 Proponents of Chapter 212
believe that requiring consideration of outside information will give the Board insight
8. See Joseph T. Hallinan, Although Outlawed, Parole is a Persistent Problem, ThIES-PICAYUNE, June
23, 1996, at A12 (describing parole boards as toll booth attendants because inmates are released from prison almost
as fast as they are put in prison); Scrap the Parole System, DETROrr NEWS, June 26, 1995, Editorial (explaining new
legislation that will stop violent offenders from going back to the streets through a revolving door made of early
release programs); see also Tim Landis, Real Time: Truth-in-Sentencing Law Changes Plea Negotiations, ST. LOUIS
POST-DISPATCH, July 11, 1996, at 1 (reporting that Illinois's "Truth-in-Sentencing" law was enacted in response
to the public cry for longer prison terms); Nix "Good Time," COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Sept. 21, 1993, at 6A (stating
that the public is sick of prisoners only serving a fraction of their sentences).
9. See Carl Ingram, Senate Votes to Toughen Law on Spousal Rape, L.A. TMES, Aug. 15, 1992, at Al
(reporting that the California Senate voted overwhelmingly to lengthen prison sentences for spousal rapists); Laura
Meade Kirk, Bill Would Put Child Abusers in Prison Longer, PROVIDENCE J-BULL., Nov. 9, 1995, at 3B
(describing Rhode Island legislation that will increase the minimum sentence for those convicted of first-degree
child abuse); Joseph F. Sullivan, Whitman Approves Stringent Restrictions on Sex Criminals, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 1,
1994, at BI (describing New Jersey legislation that increases minimum prison terms for violent sex offenders); see
also Philip Hager, State Justices Affirm Penalty for Use of Gun, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 15, 1992, at A3 (stating that the
California Supreme Court upheld a 1989 state law that requires judges to add on an extra three to five years to
sentences if a firearm was used to commit a crime); Mark Ragan, Prison Chief Links Tough Crime Laws,
Overcrowded Cells, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Jan. 14, 1986, at B3 (quoting the director of the California
Department of Corrections as stating that recent legislation requiring longer prison terms has filled the state's
prisons to 163% of capacity).
10. Landis, supra note 8, at 1; see id. (reporting that the Illinois Legislature enacted the truth-in-sentencing
law because the public criticized the policy of giving prisoners time off for good behavior); Nix "Good Time,"
supra note 8, at 6A (explaining legislation that would limit various early release programs in Ohio); see also John
M. Broder, Curbs Upheld on Multiple Killers' Rights, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 26, 1995, at A3 (stating that the United
States Supreme Court upheld California legislation that limits the ability of multiple murderers to appeal for early
parole).
11. See Governor George Allen, The Courage of Our Convictions: The Abolition of Parole Will Save Lives
and Money, POL'Y REV., Spring 1995, at 4 (explaining that parole should be abolished in Virginia because
incarceration is the only foolproof crime-prevention technique); Sharon Shahid, Letting Offenders Out on Parole,
USA TODAY, Sept. 19, 1991, at 13A (reporting that the Nebraska state attorney general suggested that parole be
abolished); see also Nix "Good Time," supra note 8, at 6A (stating that the American people should not tolerate
parolees being dumped out into society simply because prisons are overcrowded).
12. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 3000(a)(1) (West 1982 & Supp. 1997) (declaring that the period following
incarceration is a critical time, and that parole will be used as a means of promoting successful reintegration into
the community); see also George G. Killinger & Paul F. Cromwell, Jr., Parole, in ALTERNATIvES TO
IMPRISONMENT: CORRECTIONS IN THE COMMUNITY 400,421 (1974) (stating that proponents of parole argue that
it is a humanitarian way to protect the public).
13. See supra note I I and accompanying text (stating that legislators want to abolish parole).
14. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 3042 (amended by Chapter 212) (requiring the Parole Board to consider all
information received concerning an inmate's parole).
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that will aid in the determination of an inmate's parole.' 5 Specifically, Chapter 212
requires the Board to consider the sentencing judge's concerns regarding an inmate's
early release. 6
Consequently, Chapter 212 poses both constitutional and practical problems.
Opponents of Chapter 212 fear that allowing the judiciary to influence the Board's
decision in granting parole violates California's separation of powers doctrine. 7
Moreover, legislation that limits parole creates practical concerns about prison
overcrowding. 18 Currently, California prisons suffer from severe overpopulation, 9
and legislation that limits the availability of parole adds to this serious problem
without providing any solution.
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Notifying interested parties that an inmate is eligible for parole and considering
statements made by those parties is common practice in many states. 20 Typically, the
sentencing judge, the attorneys, the victims, and the law enforcement agencies in-
volved are notified in advance that an inmate will be having a parole hearing to
decide whether the parole authority should grant the person parole.2 ' The parole
authority usually welcomes comments and recommendations, and the information
received may be used to set the terms and conditions of parole 2
15. See ASSENMLY FLOOR, COMmrEE ANALYSIS OF SB 1600, at 2 (June 28, 1996) (stating that Chapter
212 will ensure that the Parole Board gives full consideration to the harm caused by the prisoner).
16. CAL. PENAL CODE § 3042(0(3) (amended by Chapter 212); see id. (requiring that the Parole Board
consider th- information received from the judge).
17. ASSEMBLYFLOOR, COMMrr=EANALYSiS OFSB 1600, at 3 (June 28, 1996); see id. (acknowledging that
opponents have concerns that Chapter 212 may allow judges to infringe upon the Board's power over prisoners).
18. Jason S. Ornduff, Releasing the Elderly Inmates, 4 ELDER W. 173 (1996); see id. (discussing prison
overcrowding in the United States, and how using the sentence of life-without-parole especially adds to this
prevalent problem).
19. See infra notes 54-57 and accompanying text (describing the prison overpopulation problem that exists
in California).
20. See, &g., ALA. CODE § 15-22-36(d) (1995) (requiring that notice be sent to certain parties 30 days before
an inmate's parole hearing, and that those notified have the opportunity to express their views in person or in
writing); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31-41 1(H) (West 1996) (stating that notice is to be given to certain parties 15
days before an inmate's parole hearing, and that the victim shall be informed of the right to submit a written report
to the Parol2 Board); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 947.1745(6) (West 1996) (explaining that the sentencing judge is to receive
90 days notice of an inmate's parole release date interview and that the judge may object to the release of the
prisoner); OHIO PEV. CODE ANN. § 2967.12(A) (Anderson 1996) (providing that various parties shall be notified
at least three weeks before the parole authority grants an inmate parole, and allowing those notified to send a written
statement to the parole authority); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-28-505(b) (1996) (setting forth the parties to be notified
at least 14 days before an inmate's parole hearing).
21. See supra note 20 (describing the notification procedure of several states).
22. See ALA. CODE § 15-22-36(e)(2)(1) (1995) (allowing the parties that are notified to express their views
in person or in writing to the parole board); ARIZ. REV. STAT ANN. § 31-411(H) (West 1996) (stating that the victim
has the right to submit a written report to the parole board); Onto REv. CODE ANN. § 2967.12(B) (Anderson 1996)
(providing that those notified may send any written statement to the parole authority).
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A. Notification of Parole Hearings and Consideration of Materials Given the
Board Before Chapter 212
Before the enactment of Chapter 212, California law set forth general require-
ments concerning notification of an inmate's eligibility for parole. California law
required the Board to send written notice of the possibiliity of an inmate's parole
thirty days before the Board met to determine the inmate's eligibility.24 Among those
notified by the Board were the sentencing judge, the defendant's attorney, the District
Attorney, and the law enforcement agencies involved in the caseY Although the law
required that written notice be sent to the above referenced parties, no guidelines had
been established with respect to how the Board should send notification, or what
consideration should be given to incoming statements and recommendations.
Prior to Chapter 212, California law required that any materials considered by
the Board to determine parole must be incorporated into the transcript unless doing
so would create a dangerous situation.27 Before the enactment of Chapter 212,
California law did not require the Board to consider any information received from
outside parties, and accordingly, the Board could base its decision solely upon the
inmate's files.28
B. Chapter 212
Chapter 212 expands existing law by explicitly requiring that information
received by the Board be considered in determining an inmate's parole. 9 Chapter
212 sets forth procedures to ensure that the Board fully comprehends the impact that
the release of the inmate will have upon the community.30 Specifically, Chapter 212
mandates that the Board consider incoming comments and recommendations to
23. See 1991 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 1017, sec. 1, at 4490 (amending CAL. PENAL CODE § 3042) (requiring
written notice sent to various parties, and that any information shall be read into the transcript).
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Compare 1991 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 1017, sec. 1, at 4490 (amending CAL PENAL CODE § 3042) (stating
only that information received is to be incorporated into the transcript of the hearing) with CAL. PENAL CODE § 3042
(amended by Chapter 212) (requiring that information received by the Board be considered in determining an
inmate's parole).
27. CAL. PENAL CODE § 3042(d) (amended by Chapter 212).
28. See 1991 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 1017, see. 1, at 4490 (amending CAL. PENAL CODE § 3042) (stating only
that information received is to be incorporated into the transcript of the hearing).
29. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 3042(f)(3) (amended by Chapter 212).
30. See id. § 3042(a) (maintaining that the Board is still required to notify the sentencing judge, the
defendant's attorney, the District Attorney, and the law enforcement agencies involved, at least 30 days before the
Board meets to determine an inmate's parole); see also ASSEMBLY FLOOR, COMMrrrEE ANALYSIS OF SB 1600, at
2 (June 28, 1996) (explaining that Chapter 212 ensures the Board fully considers the inmate's crime).
1997/ Criminal Procedure
obtain more depth and understanding about the prisoner and the crime committed."'
Moreover, the legislation singles out the sentencing judge as a source of vital infor-
mation because the judge can enlighten the Board about the harm caused by the
inmate. a2
Chapter 212 provides specific procedures describing how the Board is to notify
the judge about the upcoming hearing. For instance, Chapter 212 requires that the
judge which presided over the inmate's trial be notified by certified mail with return
receipt requested.33 Moreover, the judge, or any other person, may send any un-
privileged information to the Board that is pertinent to the inmate's parole.34 The
rationale in requiring the judge and others to influence the Board's decision is to en-
sure that the determination of parole will be based on a solid understanding of the
past and present situation, and not upon sterile files that only state the actions of the
inmate.
35
Chapter 212 further declares that nothing in § 3042 of the California Penal Code
limits what is sent to the Board and that all comments and recommendations should
be reviewed and considered in determining an inmate's parole.3 6 This provides
assurance that the Board is considering the inmate's impact upon the community, but
still leaves the determination of parole in the hands of the Board.37 The fact that the
judge's recommendations are not conclusive of the parole proceeding, in that the
Board continues to have the final decision regarding parole, however, fails to
alleviate the concern of those who believe that required judicial influence over a
prisoner's parole violates the separation of powers.
31. ASSEMiBLY FLOOR, COMMrrrEE ANALYSIS OF SB 1600, at 2 (June 28, 1996); see CAL. PENAL CODE §
3042(0(3) (amended by Chapter 212) (explaining that the information received by the Board shall be considered
in determining an inmate's parole).
32. See ASSMRLY FLOOR, CO MtrrTE ANALYSIS oF SB 1600. at 2 (June 28, 1996) (acknowledging that
sentencing judges usually know a lot about the inmates, and that judges will generally know if the inmate poses
a threat to the public); see also CAL. PENAL CODE § 3042(0 (amended by Chapter 212) (requiring that the judge's
notification be sent by certified mail with return receipt requested, and specifying that the judge's recommendations
shall be considered by the Parole Board).
33. CAL. PENAL CODE § 3042(f)(1) (amended by Chapter 212).
34. Id. § 3042(0(2) (amended by Chapter 212).
35. See ASSEMBLY FLOOR, COMMrrrEE ANALYSIS OF SB 1600, at 2 (June 28, 1996) (stating that parole
officers typically have only nondescript case files about the inmates and that Chapter 212 will ensure that the Parole
Board considers the actual grievousness of the crime).
36. CAL. PENAL CODE § 3042(0(3) (amended by Chapter 212).
37. See infra Part III.B. (explaining that the judge is not empowered to decide a prisoner's parole because
Chapter 212 merely provides that ajudge may forward information to be considered by the Parole Board).
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HI. JUDICIAL INFLUENCE OVER PAROLE AND THE SEPARATION OF
POWERS DOCTRINE
A. Federal Separation of Powers
Although separation of powers is not expressly guaranteed in the United States
Constitution, 8 the Supreme Court has inferred the separation of powers doctrine
from principles found within the Constitution. 39 For many years, this nation has been
protected against the tyranny of an unbalanced government by enforcing the lines
between the governmental branches.4 However, the federal doctrine of separation
of powers has not been forced upon state governments.4 '
Since the Supreme Court has held that states are not required to embrace the
separation of powers doctrine, the individual states are left to determine their own
distribution of governmental power.42 Consequently, Chapter 212 will violate the
separation of powers only if California endorses the separation of powers doctrine
and interprets required judicial influence over parole decisions as violative of that
doctrine. 43
38. See Springer v. Philippine Islands, 277 U.S. 189, 201 (1928) (explaining that the United States
Constitution does not contain an express provision that mandates the separation of governmental powers); Bean
v. Nevada, 410 F. Supp. 963, 966 (D. Nev. 1974) (stating that the separation of powers doctrine is not expressly
enunciated in the United States Constitution); Matthew J. Tanielian, Separation of Powers and the Supreme Court:
One Doctrine, Two Visions, 8 ADMIN. LJ. AM. U. 961, 961-62 (1995) (commenting that the United States
Constitution does not thoroughly set forth the separation of powers doctrine).
39. See Springer, 277 U.S. at 201 (noting that the separation of powers doctrine logically follows from the
Constitution's separation of the several governmental departments); Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 190-91
(1880) (explaining that the lines between the three branches of government shall be clearly defined); see also Bean,
410 F. Supp. at 966 (maintaining that the separation of powers can be inferred from the Constitution's underlying
principles).
40. David A. Martland, Note, Justice Without Favor: Due Process and Separation of Executive and Judicial
Powers in State Government, YALE LJ. 1675, 1675 (1985); see id. (explaining that the separation of powers is
necessary to ensure the impartial administration of laws); see also Robert M. O'Neil, Separation of Powers, 37
FAiORY LJ. 539, 539 (1988) (stating that the framers of the Constitution wanted distinct lines between the branches
of government).
41. Martland, supra note 40, at 1675; see, e.g., Hughes v. Superior Court (Contra Costa County), 399 U.S.
460,467 (1950) (noting that the Fourteenth Amendment does not make the states abide by the separation of powers
doctrine); Dreyer v. Illinois, 187 U.S. 71, 84 (1902) (holding that a state is to determine on its own whether to
recognize the separation of powers doctrine); Bean, 410 F. Supp. at 966 (acknowledging that the separation of
powers doctrine has not been extended to the states).
42. Dreyer, 187 U.S. at 84; see supra note 41 and accompanying text (explaining that states determine on
their own whether to follow the separation of powers doctrine).
43. See infra notes 45-48 and accompanying text (describing California's separation of powers doctrine,
and the court's determination that parole hearings are not a judicial function).
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B. Chapter 212 and the Separation of Powers
California, like all states,44 recognizes the separation of powers within its
Constitution.45 Accordingly, legislation requiring a branch of government to infringe
upon the duties of another branch of government violates the California Con-
stitution. 6 Various court decisions hold that the paroling of inmates constitutes a
purely administrative function that is properly performed by the Board. Thus, in
keeping with the separation of powers, the California Constitution prohibits the
judiciary from infringing upon the parole system.!8 Chapter 212, however, escapes
a constitutional violation, by ensuring that judges do not interfere with the Board's
administrative function.49
Chapter 212 requires that a judge may forward information to be considered by
the Board in assessing an inmate's parole 50 This requirement does not empower
judges to decide a prisoner's parole, but only requires the Board to consider a judge's
concerns regarding the inmate.51 Moreover, Chapter 212 does not command that the
Board follow the comments and recommendations sent to it by the judge and
others.52 The power in determining an inmate's parole continues to be in the hands
of the Board, and not in the hands of a judge or anyone else.53 Accordingly, Chapter
212 will likely survive constitutional scrutiny because it does not allow the judiciary
44. See O'Neil, supra note 40, at 539 (declaring that all the states recognize the separation of powers
doctrine in their constitutions).
45. CAL. CONST. art. Im, § 3; see id. (stating that the powers of one state government may not exercise either
of the others except as permitted by this Constitution); see also I B.E. WmTUiN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW,
Constitutional Law § 107 (9th ed. 1988) (explaining that the California Constitution expressly embraces the
separation of powers doctrine).
46. CAL CONST. art. HI, § 3.
47. See, e.g., In re Tucker, 5 Cal. 3d 171, 177,486 P.2d 657,659,95 Cal. Rptr. 761,763 (1971) (explaining
that the length of sentences and the conditions of parole are for the determination of the Adult Authority, and are
not judicial acts (quoting In re Schoengarth, 66 Cal. 2d 295, 425 P.2d 200, 57 Cal. Rptr. 600 (1967))); li re Sandel,
64 Cal. 2d 412,415,412 P.2d 806, 809,50 Cal. Rptr. 462,465 (1966) (stating that the imposition of a sentence is
a judicial function, while the carrying out of that sentence is an administrative function); In re Lee, 177 Cal. 690,
693, 171 P. 958,959 (1918) (explaining that the judicial branch determines guilt and imposes the sentence, whereas
an administrative body carries out that sentence); In re Fain, 65 Cal. App. 3d 376, 389, 135 Cal. Rptr. 543, 550
(1976) (declaring that parole is purely an administrative matter); see also Douglas J. Hitchcock, The California
Adult Authority-Administrative Sentencing and the Parole Decision as a Problem in Administrative Discretion, 5
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 360,370 (1972) (citing the California Supreme Court as holding that the function of parole is
wholly administrative).
48. See suora notes 44-47 and accompanying text (explaining that parole is not a judicial function, and that
California embraces the separation of powers doctrine).
49. See infra notes 50-53 and accompanying text (discussing how Chapter 212 does not create judicial
interference with the Board's function).
50. CAL. PENAL CODE § 3042(0(2) (amended by Chapter 212).
51. See id. § 3042(0(3) (amended by Chapter 212) (requiring only that the parole board consider the
information being received).
52. Id.
53. See supra note 50 and accompanying text (stating that a judge may forward information, and that the
Board is only required to merely consider the information being received).
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to infringe upon the Board's decision, but merely requires that the Board have all
available information concerning the parole of a particular inmate.
IV. LIMITING THE OPPORTUNITY OF PAROLE
The concerns presented by the judge and others will influence the Board's
decision, and these concerns will limit the opportunity for an inmate to receive
parole.m Although many individuals desire to incarcerate criminals for the entirety
of their sentence, no state has a prison system with the facilities to satisfy that
fixation.55 In fact, even though California has the largest prison system in the
country, 6 the current prison population rate exceeds well beyond the intended
capacity.57 Consequently, prisons are becoming more dangerous and unsanitary. 8
Thus, legislation focused on limiting parole only assists in increasing the problem to
epidemic levels.
Without the money to adequately expand the current system,59 California will be
forced to find alternative means of controlling the prison population. One way to
combat prison overpopulation is to be more selective about who is being imprisoned.
Instead of creating overpopulation problems by trying to incarcerate every criminal,
one solution could be to incarcerate only the criminals that pose a threat to society.
The employment of early release programs, like parole, helps lower the nonviolent
criminal population in prisons so that space remains available for those criminals that
54. See ASSEMBLY FLOOR, COMMrrrEE ANALYSIS OF SB 1600, at 3 (June 28, 1996) (stating that Chapter
212 will help keep inmates incarcerated for the entirety of their sentence).
55. See Michael Gottesman & Lewis J. Hecker, Parole: A Critique oflis Legal Foundations and Conditions,
38 N.Y.U. L. REV. 702, 706-07 (1963) (stating that with the increase in crime, a state no longer enjoys the option
of incarcerating every prisoner for the maximum term).
56. California Tops the Nation in Rate of Parolees Rejailed, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Sept. 19, 1991, at
Al.
57. John Hurst, Full Cells and Empty Pockets, L.A. TIMES, May 8, 1991, at Al; see DATA ANALYSIS UNIT,
CAL. DEP'T OF CORRECTIONS, CALIFORNIA PRISONERS & PAROLEES 1992, at 1-1 (1995) [hereinafter DATA
ANALYSIS] (stating that the 1992 prison population was 186.6% of the design capacity); Hurst, supra, at Al
(reporting that in the year 2000, the inmate population will be so high that every 125 prisoners will have to be
placed in space designed for 100); see also Ragan, supra note 9, at B3 (noting that there are three state prisons that
operate at 200% over capacity).
58. Ornduff, supra note 18, at 176-80; see Hurst, supra note 57, at Al (stating that state prisons are
dangerously overcrowded because the population is growing); see also Ragan, supra note 9, at B3 (reporting that
several state prisons have lawsuits condemning overcrowding).
59. Lockyer Proposes Shift in Prison, BC CYCLE, Apr. 6, 1995, at Regional News; see Hurst, supra note
57, at Al (noting that the cost of incarceration in California, not including prison construction, is $2.1 billion a year
and climbing); Eric Lichtblau & Paul Fledman, Boxer, Feinstein Urge U.S. to Redirect Money to County's Jails,
L.A. TIMES, May 22, 1996, at BI (stating that Senators Barbara Boxer and Diane Feinstein are demanding money
from the federal government to help pay for the cost of running the Los Angeles County jail system); Lockyer
Proposes Shift in Prison, supra, at Regional News (describing Senate Pro Tem Bill Lockyer's plan to divert
prisoners to county control because the increasing State prison population would require the building of 15 new
prisons and stating that the construction of 15 new prisons is unaffordable and would be the largest public works
project since the pyramids).
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are a danger to the community.6 Unfortunately, a substantial margin of error occurs
in determining which criminals are a threat to society, and recidivism of parolees
remains one of the reasons why legislatures want to limit parole.61
Although concern that parolees are committing new crimes once they return to
the community may be justified,62 parole should not be discarded as an alternative
to unsafe prisons and jails. Instead, legislation should focus on increasing supervision
of parolees and improving the accuracy of predicting recidivism. California can no
longer demand incarceration to stifle crime without increased facilities to house
prisoners. 63 Absent funding required to expand the current prison system, alternatives
like parole will need to be utilized.
V. CONCLUSION
Current frustration with crime has lead to tougher policies regarding criminals,
64
and less concern about providing a humanitarian means of integrating prisoners back
into society.65 Accordingly, legislatures have reacted by limiting the amount of
prisoners released on parole.6 Chapter 212 attempts to limit parole by requiring the
Board of Prison Terms to consider the information received from the sentencing
judge and others.67 Although Chapter 212 may meet constitutional challenges on the
basis that it conflicts with the separation of powers doctrine, Chapter 212 will survive
such scrutiny because the judge only plays a limited role in the Board's deter-
rination. However, Chapter 212 poses practical problems in that limiting parole will
have an adverse effect upon the prison population. The advantages of requiring the
Board to consider the impact of the parolee upon the community may be at the
expense of compounding current problems regarding prison overpopulation.
60. See Shahid, supra note 11, at 13A (explaining that parole may be used to relieve an overcrowded
correctional system).
61. CURT R. BARTOL & ANNE M. BARTOL, PSYCHOLOGY AND THE LAw: RESEARCH AND APPLICATION 328-
30 (2d ed. 1994); see id. (describing various ways to attempt to predict criminal behavior, and stating that even after
careful study, prediction will result only in a rough estimation); Allen, supra note 11, at 6 (arguing that less crime
would result if parole was abolished); see also Shahid, supra note 1I, at 13A (reporting that the Nebraska attorney
general suggested abolishing the parole system after a parolee killed a person).
62. See DATA ANALYSIS,supra note 57, at 1-1 (reporting that 34,932 parolees were returned to custody after
early release); id. at 5-1 (reporting that parole violators returned to prison with a new term increased from 16,010
during 1991 to 17,939 during 1992); California Tops Nation in Rate of Parolees Rejailed, supra note 56, at Al
(explaining that only 19% of parolees in California successfully complete the program). But see Shahid, supra note
11, at 13A (stating that the parole system does not create new crime).
63. See supra note 55 and accompanying text (stating that no state has the option of incarcerating every
prisoner for the maximum term); supra note 59 and accompanying text (discussing the cost of housing prisoners).
64. See supra notes 7-9 and accompanying text (describing the public's frustration toward crime and several
"tough on crime" policies).
65. See supra note I I and accompanying text (noting legislation that is focused on abolishing parole).
66. id.
67. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 3042 (amended by Chapter 212); see also ASSEMBLY FLOOR, COMIrrrEE
ANALYSIS OF SB 1600, at 3 (June 28, 1996) (stating that Chapter 212 will aid in keeping inmates incarcerated for
the entirety of their sentence).
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APPENDIX
Code Section Affected
Penal Code § 3042 (amended).
SB 1600 (Leonard); 1996 STAT. Ch. 212

